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PREFACE 
This paper is part of a series of political economy Working Papers prepared for the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) 
and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The purpose of these papers is to explore 
strategic political economy issues that would facilitate or inhibit livestock policy 
reforms in the IGAD region that would benefit poor producers.  
Specifically, this paper seeks to understand how the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI), a project jointly managed by 
IGAD and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative of FAO (PPLPI), can assist the poor 
livestock producers in the greater Horn of Africa to improve their livelihoods through 
strategic policy or institutional interventions. Unlike many policy papers, however, 
this report specifically and explicitly examines the political context in which livestock 
are produced, and aims to identify entry points that are truly feasible given these 
political realities. The report identifies key national and international actors, 
institutions and processes that surround formal and informal policy-making relevant to 
livestock production, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally, strategies 
and resources required to make the politically feasible changes and creations possible. 
The recommendations made in this paper are therefore based on strategic choices, 
and not the technical or economic merits of various policy options. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries, and especially those 
of the Horn of Africa. Animals are a source of protein for human diets and can serve to 
provide income, employment and foreign exchange within a country. For many low 
income producers, livestock also serves as a store of wealth, provides draught power 
and organic fertilizer for crop production, acts as a means of transport, and serves as 
a vital component of social functions and exchange. Consumption of livestock and 
livestock products in developing countries, though starting from a low base, is growing 
rapidly. This sector growth could provide opportunities for the livestock-dependent 
poor to improve their livelihood, and this report aims to recommend politically 
feasible policy and institutional changes that can allow this to happen. 
To arrive at its recommendations, this report uses the analytic tools of political 
science to determine policies that will be truly feasible in a particular real-world 
political context.  The author is neither an economist nor a specialist in livestock 
production and is not using the criteria of those disciplines in its suggestions.  The 
report instead seeks to select on the grounds of political feasibility from among the 
recommendations that local and international experts have made on technical or 
economic grounds. Thus, the report identifies key national and international actors, 
institutions and processes and their role in policy-making relevant to livestock, the 
institutional bases of existing policies, and finally strategies and resources required to 
make selected changes and creations possible. 
Methodologically, the paper is based on several weeks of field work in the area, 
supplemented with a thorough review of government documents, newspapers and 
recently published research. The author relied foremost upon the informed observer 
method of research, conducting interviews with individuals and groups of people in a 
position to understand the political economy of the livestock sector, including the 
processes that shape its policies and their reform. Thus interviews were held with 
those in the government, the donor community, non-governmental organizations, 
academia, and the leadership of relevant livestock and other civil society 
organizations. These interviews were not a ‘random sample’ nor even necessarily 
‘representative’; the author sought those who had knowledge drawn from their own 
work and experience.  
Due to the sensitive political nature of this research, interviewees were offered 
anonymity and confidentiality for their statements, and very few people chose to 
waive this right. Even though this report cannot cite their names, the author 
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subjected informants’ statements to high standards of rigor. The author sought to be 
conscious of any partisan bias or rumor that informants might have had in their report 
and whether they were actually in a position to know on personal or very strong 
secondary authority what they reported. In most cases corroboration for key analytic 
points was sought as well, either from other informants or through quotable 
statements from academic literature. Where corroboration was impossible and the 
point was important the author generally has indicated the number of people who 
supported the point, so the reader can judge for him/herself the strength of the 
evidence. On occasion, the use of corroboration via academic literature may give the 
paper a ‘desk study’ veneer, but it is the understandings of the informants – analyzed 
with the theoretical tools of political science – that drive the conclusions.  
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the authors, IGAD LPI, FAO PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector 
Analysis and Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of either the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations or the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its 
authorities concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.  
The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not 
constitute in any way the position of the FAO, IGAD,  the Livestock Policy Initiative nor 
the governments studied.  
 
David K. Leonard 
Research Director 
Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) 
 
Date of publication: 2007. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report provides an analysis of the political and economic context within which 
livestock-related policies and organizations are formed and operate in Sudan. The 
report assesses the political and economic forces that limit the design and 
implementation of pro-poor livestock policies and suggests plausible entry points for 
policy interventions, taking into account political realities in Sudan. 
Several political and economic factors limit the possibilities of implementing pro-poor 
livestock policies in Sudan: 
• the conflict in Darfur is exacerbating Sudan’s humanitarian crisis and diverting 
funding and attention away from pro-poor development policies and programmes. 
• the economic system has historically favoured the horizontal expansion of crop 
production at the expense of livestock production and pastoral livelihoods. 
• the political system is run by a small elite affiliated with the National Congress 
Party that formulates development policy without sufficient consideration of the 
needs and desires of poor livestock owners. 
• the rise of oil production has disrupted pastoral livelihoods in oil producing areas 
and diminished the importance of livestock production for the Sudanese economy. 
• the flows of international aid and assistance have supported and continue to 
support government policies that harm pastoral livelihoods and lead to conflict. 
Despite the persistence of conflict and insecurity, recent peace agreements and 
development programmes address issues of importance for livestock and pastoralism:  
• Land Tenure: After peace, land tenure is the most important issue for pastoral 
livelihoods. The Land Commissions created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
have the potential to safeguard the rights and interests of poor livestock owners, 
although powerful political and economic actors, including oil interests, may 
influence the Commissions in such a way that the outcomes are not pro-poor. 
• Green Alert Programme: The ruling National Congress Party introduced this new 
development programme in July 2006. It is focused on increasing crop production 
and will likely lead to further marginalisation of poor livestock keepers in Sudan. 
International organizations and donors should carefully consider the likely impacts 
of this programme on the Sudanese poor before agreeing to support it. 
• “Settling the Nomads”: Nomads have historically been marginalised and blamed 
for an array of social, economic, and environmental problems. Current government 
policies and programmes promoting the settlement of migratory pastoralists could 
have negative outcomes for nomadic populations. 
• Censuses: There is an urgent need for accurate censuses of Sudan’s human and 
livestock populations as well as a “land census” to survey the status of natural 
resources. This information could be foundational for meaningful pro-poor policies 
and programmes, but the persistence of conflict and massive population 
displacements make credible and legitimate censuses difficult to conduct. 
• Marketing System: The livestock commodity chain in Sudan is dominated by 
brokers and wealthy exporters, to the detriment of primary producers. Current 
efforts to improve the marketing system should pay greater attention to ways to 
safeguard and improve the livelihoods of poor livestock owners. 
• Taxes and Fees: There are numerous taxes and fees for livestock production that 
adversely affect pastoral livelihoods and the success of other policy interventions. 
• Disease Control: Livestock disease control in Sudan has focused on economically-
significant diseases with an international reach such as rinderpest and avian flu, 
but greater consideration for animal health interventions to assist poor livestock 
keepers is warranted. 
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• Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War: Livestock keepers and livestock are 
killed and maimed by mines and unexploded ordnance, making mine action an 
important element of pro-poor policy initiatives in affected areas.  
• Regional Issues within Sudan:  
o Darfur: The persistence of conflict effectively prevents meaningful pro-poor 
policy interventions in many areas of Darfur. 
o Southern Sudan: Peace presents many opportunities for livestock owners in 
Southern Sudan, but implementation of the CPA has been slow and the 
persistence of insecurity threatens pastoral livelihoods. 
o Eastern Sudan: The peace agreement concluded in October 2006 could pave the 
way for meaningful pro-poor livestock policy initiatives in Eastern Sudan, but it 
also must overcome significant obstacles. 
Given the on-going conflicts in Sudan and the high degree of politicisation and 
entrenched interests surrounding many of the above issues the best way of introducing 
new perspectives on them and creating new dynamics for negotiation and decision-
making may well be to address them on an IGAD-wide basis. In such a setting, key 
actors may feel less threatened and the IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative will be clearly 
legitimate in exercising leadership. 
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ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
National Livestock Policy Issues 
• the Land Commissions need to allow for the creation of land management systems 
that are flexible enough to account for the evolution of customary law and 
temporal and spatial variations in fodder production. 
• a livestock market information system and improved communication networks to 
provide rural populations with information about livestock prices at secondary and 
terminal markets would be beneficial to the poor. 
• the actual effects on poor livestock producers of the proposed open auction system 
are unclear and might be studied before extending it to Sudan’s main livestock 
markets. 
• expert opinions on the likely long-term effects of the free vaccine programme vary 
widely. Before continuing the programme it probably would be beneficial to seek 
out these opinions, including involving poor livestock owners in the discussions.   
• increase the size and capabilities of the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries 
and state ministries so that they can better plan and implement pro-poor livestock 
policies and projects. 
• the different federal ministries and agencies that address pastoral and livestock 
issues seem poorly coordinated. The creation of a coordinating committee that can 
better plan federal livestock and pastoral development efforts might be worthy of 
consideration. 
Regional Livestock Policy Issues 
• the proposed dam on the Upper Nile and Jonglei canal is likely to have major 
environmental and welfare implications for the Southern Sudan. The Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS) might wish to consider impact assessments and feasibility 
studies of before moving forward with these projects. 
• there is a marked lack of coordination in livestock marketing efforts in the 
Southern Sudan. GOSS may wish to consider one agency to oversee the livestock 
marketing system and coordinate the efforts of governments, producers and traders 
to improve livestock production and exports. 
Recommendations for Donors 
• political and strategic assessments need to be conducted as part of all development 
initiatives to examine the likely outcomes of policies and projects for the Sudanese 
poor, including livestock keepers.   
• if GOSS moves forward with plans for a large hydroelectric dam and the Jonglei 
canal in Southern Sudan, support should be contingent upon a comprehensive study 
of the projects’ social and environmental impacts, as well as fair compensation and 
adequate services for displaced populations and lost livelihoods. 
Recommendations for the IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative 
• readjudication of land claims for those areas of Sudan that have now achieved 
peace is high on both the national and sub-national agendas. Some of the land 
issues are common to other IGAD countries. The GONU and GOSS may welcome 
participation in an LPI-run IGAD-wide analysis and discussion of these issues. 
• the GOSS is short of the technical capacity it will need to undertake its regional 
Land Commission process and may well welcome an officer from LPI to provide 
regionally-specific analysis and assistance. 
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• sudan’s debates over the sedentarisation of pastoralists parallel those in many 
other IGAD countries and the country might benefit from LPI’s addressing them in 
an IGAD-wide forum. 
• many of Sudan’s marketing issues also are common to other countries in the 
Greater Horn of Africa and the country almost certainly would benefit from an LPI 
effort to address them on an IGAD-wide basis. 
• donor support of government projects, such as the Green Alert Programme should 
be contingent on land use and development processes being participatory, 
inclusive, and transparent at all levels of government.  
• IGAD LPI should strengthen local level governance systems, producer groups, and 
Pastoralists Unions so that poor livestock owners can play a greater role in policy 
and project decisions that affect them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Livestock is vital to the welfare of large numbers of poor Sudanese. This paper 
evaluates the political economy of livestock and pastoralism in Sudan with a 
focus on how policies are formulated and could be improved to better serve 
the interests of poor livestock keepers. 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the tenth largest country in the 
world, covering over 2.5 million km². Northern Sudan is characterised mainly 
by desert and semi-desert ecological zones as well as low rainfall savanna. 
Southern Sudan includes low rainfall savanna, high rainfall savanna, and the 
flood plain known as the Sudd. The defining geographical feature of Sudan is 
the Nile River. The White Nile enters Sudan from Uganda and the Blue Nile 
flows from Ethiopia; the confluence is at the capital Khartoum, from where 
the Nile River travels north to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Sudan has a 
human population of 36-41 million and an official livestock population 
estimate of over 130 million (cattle, sheep, goats, camels).1 
Pastoralism and livestock are significant in Sudan’s history as well as its 
present. Although statistical information from the government of Sudan is 
generally unreliable,2 several sources interviewed for this project estimated 
that 80 to 90 percent of Sudan’s households own livestock, with perhaps one 
third to one-half of all households reliant upon livestock for their livelihood. 
Despite the importance of livestock for Sudan’s rural and urban poor 
populations, decades of development policies and projects in Sudan have 
promoted the horizontal expansion of crop production and marginalised 
livestock and pastoralism. Successive governments have seized vast quantities 
of rangelands and pasturelands to promote irrigated and mechanised rain-fed 
agricultural production, causing social, political, and economic disruption 
virtually throughout Sudan. The failure of past development efforts are 
evident in today’s violent conflicts, massive population displacements, and 
extensive food insecurity. Recent peace agreements in Southern Sudan and 
Eastern Sudan provide opportunities for a reappraisal of past policies and 
creation of new practices to guide Sudan into peace and prosperity.  
There is a pressing need for a re-evaluation of livestock policy in Sudan. As a 
result of recent peace agreements, new policies and institutions are being 
created in Sudan that will impact livestock and livelihoods for decades to 
come. There are numerous opportunities to build new pro-poor initiatives on 
the ashes of the flawed development policies of the past. Political power 
shifts create openings for participatory processes that could formulate policies 
that are equitable and just. In addition, oil-fueled economic growth can 
support the modernisation and growth of key institutions and fund much 
needed improvements in transportation, marketing, and communication 
infrastructure.  
 
                                                 
1 See “Censuses” below for more discussion of Sudan’s human and livestock statistics. 
2 This observation is based on my own reviews of government reports on human and livestock populations as well 
as economic statistics. The IMF (2006) notes: “The national accounts statistics suffer from a lack of basic 
information for many sectors, including oil, livestock, horticulture, and most services. On the expenditure side, 
data are lacking on final consumption by households, investment, and changes in stocks. There are no national 
accounts or industrial production data at sub annual frequencies. Furthermore, the annual data are being reported 
with a lag of over three years.” The World Bank (2003) also notes the inadequacy of economic and agricultural 
statistics for Southern Sudan. 
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The current political and economic context of Sudan also presents significant 
constraints that may make meaningful change impossible. The income from oil 
production has overwhelmed agricultural and livestock production in economic 
importance, but more importantly oil has lubricated political machines that 
pay insufficient attention to improving the livelihoods of the Sudanese poor. 
The Darfur Peace Agreement is dead, implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (for the south) is disconcertingly slow, and the Eastern 
Sudan Peace Agreement is too new to significantly affect conditions on the 
ground. In particular, the escalation of the conflict in Darfur could divert 
energy and interest away from peace-building and pro-poor development 
efforts elsewhere in Sudan. 
This analysis of livestock and pastoralism in Sudan was sponsored by the 
Livestock Policy Initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD LPI). The purposes of this project were (a) to describe the important 
political, civic and bureaucratic processes that surround formal and informal 
policy-making on livestock production in the IGAD countries and (b) to subject 
to a political feasibility test the various technical recommendations that 
others have made for livestock policy change in them.  
The paper is based on six weeks of in-country fieldwork, supplemented with 
further library research before and afterward. I sought out those in the 
government, the donor community, academia, and the leadership of relevant 
livestock and other civil society organizations who are in a position to know 
and understand the political economy of the sector and the processes that 
shape its formal and informal policies and their reform. I sought those who 
had knowledge drawn from their own work and experience. I conducted forty 
seven interviews with individuals from the Ministry of Animal Resources and 
Fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development 
Programme, Animal Resources Services Company, Pastoralists Union, National 
Assembly, two universities, several nongovernmental organizations, and 
livestock markets at El Muwelih (Ombdurman) and El Obeid. For various 
bureaucratic reasons I was unable to visit Southern Sudan and had to rely on 
interviews with people in the north and external to Sudan, as well as various 
documents, for that part of my analysis. 
This report is divided into two parts. Part I provides an overview of the policy 
environment in Sudan, including a discussion of the stakeholders, institutions, 
and organizations involved in the design and implementation of livestock 
policy in Sudan. Part II is an analysis of key issues for livestock and pastoralism 
in Sudan, including the National Congress Party’s 2006 “Green Alert 
Programme” a review of regional issues for Darfur, Southern Sudan, and 
Eastern Sudan. Annexes A and B survey the livestock and production systems in 
Sudan. 
 
PART I: POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Pastoralism Since Independence  
The marginalisation of pastoralists that began during colonial times continued 
after Sudan achieved independence in 1956. Successive post-independence 
governments implemented colonial-era policies that excluded pastoralists 
from areas that could be used for settlement or were demarcated for 
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agricultural expansion (Ahmed 2002). The expansion of urban areas and large 
agricultural developments combined with the forced relocation of pastoralists 
to marginal areas contributed to environmental degradation and 
desertification in both North and South Sudan (Hulme and Trilsbach 1991). The 
civil war between North and South (1956-1972) further disrupted pastoralist 
livelihoods and development. 
Post-colonial governments continued the colonial programmes of economic 
development concentrated on large-scale agriculture. Government policies of 
the 1950s and 1960s continued to favour large scale irrigation and mechanised 
agricultural projects (Adams and Howell 1979), but there was increasing 
investment during this period in the expansion of food production for the 
domestic market (O’Brien 1986). The military government of General Ibrahim 
Aboud, who took power after the 1958 coup, developed a ten-year Economic 
and Social Development Plan to cover the period 1961-1971. This plan ignored 
the traditional sector in favour of investment in the so-called modern sector; 
i.e. it focused heavily upon expanding the production of marketed agricultural 
crops and neglected the livestock sector and smallholder farming (Ibrahim 
1999; Adams and Howell 1979). 
Starting in the 1960s, veterinary services and disease control efforts increased 
in Sudan. Sudan participated in multi-country vaccination campaigns against 
economically disruptive livestock diseases, including the JP-15 (Joint Project 
of the Organization of African Unity) rinderpest campaign and the JP-28 
contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia campaign. As part of these efforts, 
Sudanese veterinarians received training and equipment. However, the failure 
to sustain surveillance, vaccination, and control measures after JP-15 led to 
incomplete efforts and the re-emergence of rinderpest in Sudan during the 
1970s, as well as its spread to neighboring countries (Majok and Schwabe 
1993; Majok et al 1991; Yilma 1989).  The resurgence of rinderpest led the 
Organization of African Unity to launch the Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign 
(PARC) in 1986.  
The 1969 coup that brought Sudanese Army officer Jaafar Nimeiri to power 
had profound implications for pastoralists. The new government enacted laws 
that resulted in the seizure of pastoral rangelands and migratory routes as 
well as disruption of local judicial and conflict resolution mechanisms. The 
1970 Unregistered Land Act enabled the government to claim vast expanses of 
pastureland, rangeland, and migratory routes, setting the stage for massive 
land seizures and population displacement during the 1970s. The settlement 
of conflicts had traditionally been handled at the local level, but in the early 
1970s the Nimeiri regime abolished the system of Native Administration in the 
northern provinces, replacing it with new systems of local government and 
legal councils that lacked legitimacy and often served the interests of political 
and economic elites (Al-Shahi 1991; cf. Keen 1994; El Arifi 1985; Morton 2005). 
Nimeiri pursued development projects that marginalised pastoralists and 
small-holder farmers. In the early 1970s, Nimeiri marketed Sudan as the 
future “bread-basket” for the Arab world, attracting World Bank loans and 
agricultural investment from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab oil-
producing countries (Kaikati 1980; Wai 1979). Large tracts of land were given 
or sold to private corporations and parastatals for mechanised rain-fed and 
irrigated agriculture,3 with the result that pastoralists were pushed to 
marginal areas or into the lands of farmers and other pastoralists, leading to 
conflicts (Hulme and Trilsbach 1991; Johnson 2003). The rapid shift towards 
export-oriented, mechanised agricultural schemes seriously disrupted the 
                                                 
3 This strategy increased the area under mechanized rain-fed agriculture by 2.56 million feddans by 1975; the 
irrigated agricultural area rose by 300,000 feddans (Gurdon 1991). 
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social and economic fabric of large areas of Sudan and eroded land use rights 
for pastoralists (Johnson 2003). Interest in commercial cattle ranches 
increased during the 1970s, but these projects either failed or never moved 
beyond the planning stage (cf. Kaikati 1980).  
Also part of the bread-basket strategy was the plan to build the Jonglei Canal 
in southern Sudan to divert water away from the massive swamps in southern 
Sudan directly to capitalist agricultural development in Sudan and Egypt 
(Johnson 2003). When construction on the canal began in 1974, there was 
considerable local opposition based on the fact that the canal would cut 
through livestock migratory routes and negatively harm pastoral livelihoods 
(Majok and Schwabe 1996). In December 1983 the Southern People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) attacked the canal and construction equipment, 
effectively ending this project (Niblock 1987). 
Nimeiri’s rule is also significant for the exploration and discovery of oil. 
Starting in 1974, the Government of Sudan granted concessions for oil 
exploration in central and southern Sudan to multinational oil corporations 
(Patey 2006). In 1978, oil was discovered in areas used for dry season 
pastureland (HRW 2003). During the 1980s the government supplied guns to 
Baggara pastoralists and used them to displace Nuer and Dinka pastoralists 
from rangelands designated for oil production4 (HRW 2003).  
One success of the Nimeiri regime in the 1970s was achieving a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict in Southern Sudan. The Addis Ababa agreement in 
March 1972 gave the South considerable regional autonomy (Niblock 1987), 
and allowed for the establishment of veterinary services in Southern Sudan 
(Majok and Schwabe 1996). Peace also enabled a comprehensive cattle disease 
survey from 1979 to 1981 in the south’s Bahr el Ghazal province (Majok et al 
1991; Majok and Schwabe 1996).  
Nimeiri brought peace to Sudan in the early 1970s, but the development path 
he pursued during that decade directly led to the resumption of conflict in the 
1980s. The “breadbasket” strategy not only placed the government in massive 
debt, but also caused widespread social and economic problems by 
appropriating lands in the rain-fed North, displacing pastoralists, and 
disrupting migratory routes. Nimeiri’s development policies also made the 
government of Sudan dependant upon international donors for funding and 
increasingly reliant upon NGOs for service delivery (Johnson 2003). As the 
government’s legitimacy eroded and discontent grew in the early 1980s, the 
Nimeiri regime used Islam to shore up its domestic support; however this 
alienated large segments of the population, particularly in the South, where 
war resumed in 1983 after Nimeiri announced the administrative division of 
the South and imposed shari’a law on the nation (Niblock 1991; Johnson 2003; 
Hutchinson 1996). Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985 brought a brief return to 
multiparty politics in Sudan, but little relief to the Sudanese poor. 
In addition to failed development policies and war, pastoralists had to 
contend with droughts that hit Sudan in the mid 1980s. In the semi-arid areas 
where pastoral livelihoods had already been disrupted owing to changes in 
land tenure and displacement for highly-capitalised agricultural schemes, the 
1984-85 drought caused the deaths of millions of heads of livestock; for 
example the Beja of Eastern Sudan reportedly lost up to 80 percent of their 
animals (Johnson 2003). One source interviewed for this project noted that 
the ’84-85 drought also produced a shift in livestock ownership from poor 
pastoralists to rich merchants, including government officials and military 
officers who accumulated large herds. In the South, drought in 1986-87 
                                                 
4 The onset of war in 1983 temporarily interrupted oil exploration in the south. 
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resulted in out migration of people and food insecurity, which in turn led to 
increased cattle raiding (Keen 1994). 
Army Brigadier Omar al-Bashir has ruled Sudan since seizing power in a 1989 
coup. During his rule, veterinary services have expanded, contributing to a 
reported increase in Sudan’s livestock population, although official estimates 
of 130+ million may be excessively high (see “Censuses” below). Al-Bashir’s 
rule has also been characterised by violent conflict, massive population 
displacement, oil production and export, as well as peace agreements and 
nascent social and economic recovery in some parts of the country. 
Since 1989 there have been several important policy and legal changes 
affecting livestock production and livestock keepers in Sudan. The 1990 
Amendment to the Civil Transactions Act confirmed that all non-registered 
land should be considered as if registered in the name of the State. In 
addition, the Amendment prohibited appeal against land adjudications made 
by the government, including dismissal of all cases before courts at that time 
(Justice Africa 2002). The 1998 Local Government Act theoretically confers 
important responsibilities for land management and regulation to provinces 
and localities, but in reality the central government retains a strong role in 
local decision making by appointing provincial commissioners who are loyal to 
the National Congress Party (NCP) (cf. De Waal 2005). De Wit (2001) notes: “In 
contemporary Sudan this [Local Government] Act should be considered as a 
challenge to the promotion of a transparent body for local governance that 
can set a framework for equitable land and other natural resources 
management in a development context.” The 2000 Environmental Policy Act 
requires environmental impact assessments for big development projects, 
although the credibility and objectivity of these assessments is uncertain (cf. 
Kakonge and Imevbore 1993).  
Since the early 1990s the regime of President Al-Bashir has adopted fiscal 
policies designed by the International Monetary Fund. Overall these polices 
are intended to create macroeconomic stability and introduce structural 
reforms while controlling inflation and creating a strong external position (IMF 
2006; cf. EIU 2006a). These policies have resulted in privatisation of 
government corporations (e.g. Animal Resources Services Company), removal 
of veterinary drug subsidies, and transfer of vaccination service funding from 
the central government to the states (MONEC 2003). There is no Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper for Sudan, although the Joint Assessment Mission 
(2005) report effectively serves the same purpose.5 
Livestock have historically been central to Sudan’s overall economy, although 
in recent years oil production has become the dominant feature of the 
political economy of Sudan. Since 1999, livestock and livestock products 
(meat, hides and skins) have comprised approximately 20 percent of Sudan’s 
annual Gross Domestic Product (Central Bank of Sudan 1999, 2001, 2005). As 
oil production has increased, however, the relative importance of livestock 
and livestock product exports as foreign exchange earners has declined. In 
2005 oil was 82 percent (by value) of total exports while livestock and 
livestock product exports were just 3.2 percent (Central Bank of Sudan 
2005a). The International Monetary Fund attributes the recent decline in 
livestock exports to “supply constraints (inadequate capacity at the port, 
deterioration in the road infrastructure), conflict in livestock-rich areas, and 
higher domestic demand” (IMF 2006). 
 
                                                 
5 See the European Union statement in this regard at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=sd&status=new, site visited February 6, 2007. 
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Myriad obstacles further constrain possibilities for forming pro-poor policies 
and restrict open dialogue about different policy options. Conflict, 
displacement, debt, corruption, and lack of a free press all point to a country 
in crisis, with little opportunity for the design or implementation of 
meaningful pro-poor policies. Out of an estimated population of 36-41 million 
in 2006, 4-6 million Sudanese are internally displaced and the World Food 
Programme distributes food to 4-5 million people every month (CIA 2006; 
USAID 2006; UNFPA 2006; UNHCR 2006a). UNDP’s “Human Development Index” 
ranks Sudan 141 out of 177 countries (UNDP 2006). At the end of 2005, Sudan’s 
external debt was US$ 27.7 billion,6 of which US$ 24.4 billion was in arrears 
(IMF 2006). In addition, Sudan is tied for 156 out of 163 countries on 
Transparency International’s 2006 “Corruption Perceptions Index,”7 and 
ranked 139 out of 168 countries on Reporters sans Frontièrs’ “World Press 
Freedom Index 2006.”8  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Sudan 
 The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) restructured political power 
and wealth sharing in Sudan, creating what some call the “New Sudan.” For 
the Interim Period until national elections are held (in 2009), the CPA creates 
a Government of National Unity (GONU) that shares power between the 
National Congress Party (NCP), Southern People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), and other political parties that choose to participate in the 
government.9 The Executive Branch is headed by President Al-Bashir, with two 
Vice Presidents (one from the NCP and one from the SPLM) and a Council of 
Ministers. During the Interim Period, the National Legislature (National 
Assembly and Council of States) is appointed. Judicial powers are exercised 
nationally by a Constitutional Court, National Supreme Court, and court of 
appeals (CPA 2005). 
The CPA also creates an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). 
During the Interim Period the borders of South Sudan are the boundaries as 
defined at independence in 1956, but these boundaries may be redrawn based 
on the work of the land commissions created by the CPA (see “Land Tenure” 
below). GOSS has a similar structure to GONU, with federal power invested in 
executive, legislative and judicial bodies. The CPA provides for a referendum 
(in 2011) in the South to determine whether the South will remain part of a 
unified Sudanese nation or secede and become its own country (CPA 2005). 
The CPA restructures State government to provide for representation of NCP, 
SPLM, and other smaller parties. In Northern States there is majority 
representation of the NCP and in Southern States the SPLM is allocated 
majority power. Like the federal governments, the State governments have an 
executive branch (including council of ministers), legislative branch (State 
Legislature), and judiciary. 
 
                                                 
6 This represented 109 percent of Sudan’s 2005 GDP; however the IMF (2006) projects Sudan’s 2006 GDP to be US$ 
36 billion, which would change the percentage of debt per GDP downward. 
7 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2006,” 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006, site visited 3 February 2007. 
8 Reporters sans frontièrs, “World Press Freedom Index 2005,” 
http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=639, site visited 3 February 2007. 
9 Young (2005) critiques the allocation of power in the CPA, arguing that “there is absolutely no reason to assume 
that the NCP and the SPLM come anywhere near representing 80% of the Sudanese people,” although the CPA 
provides them with 80 percent of the seats in the National Assembly (NCP—52 percent; SPLM—28 percent). 
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The CPA includes a wealth sharing agreement that allocates oil revenue 
between GONU, GOSS, and the oil producing states (see “Southern Sudan” 
section below). The moribund Darfur Peace Agreement and nascent Eastern 
Sudan Peace Agreement also include wealth sharing provisions. Sudan’s 
economic growth of the last five years has been largely  owing to foreign 
investment in the oil and gas sector (EIU 2006a). As noted by the IMF (2006), 
however, Sudan faces serious economic problems in the years ahead: 
Despite an increase in oil revenues, the fiscal space of the central government 
will be constrained because of the transfers required by the peace agreement 
and decentralisation. These transfers, coupled with higher capital 
expenditures, will contribute to a substantial increase in pro-poor 
development spending. In this context, and to safeguard macroeconomic 
stability, an additional reorientation of expenditures is required, including 
through a reduction in fuel subsidies.10 
Of importance for livestock owners, in 2006 the NCP announced the creation 
of the Green Alert Programme designed to boost crop and livestock production 
through 2010 (see “Green Alert Programme” below); however the persistence 
of conflict and instability in Darfur and Southern Sudan may limit 
implementation of this development programme. 
Key Stakeholders and Institutions 
Primary Producers 
Pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, and sedentary farmers own and manage 
approximately 90 percent of Sudan’s livestock (Aklilu 2002; MONEC 2003). The 
social and economic significance of livestock for these primary producers 
varies across and within tribal groups, as well as geographically and 
temporally. There are relatively few purely nomadic groups left in Sudan that 
depend exclusively on livestock production for their livelihoods,11 but nomads 
typically own the largest herds (Ibrahim 1999). Most livestock producers are 
transhumant or sedentary farmers who maintain herds but also engage in crop 
production and/or wage labor. Urban dwellers also maintain livestock 
including donkeys for transport and small ruminants and chickens for personal 
consumption or sale. The remaining ten percent of livestock producers are 
industrial production schemes located near Khartoum, including chicken and 
egg production facilities and dairy farms.12 
Pastoralists Union 
The Pastoralists Union was created in 1994 to represent and promote the 
interests of livestock keepers to the government and non-governmental 
organizations; however the membership is mainly traders, veterinarians, and 
rich herders. There are union organizations at the local, state, and national 
levels; the national Pastoralists Union has about two hundred members drawn 
from the state organizations. In 2005, the Government of National Unity 
                                                 
10 In accordance with IMF wishes, in September 2006 GONU reduced fuel, sugar and wheat subsidies, leading to 
peaceful protests in Khartoum that were violently broken up by Sudanese police. The NCP apparently also used the 
protests as a pretext to arrest leaders from the opposition Umma Party (Al Mahdi 2006; ICG 2006b). 
11 Ibrahim (1999) notes that nomadic groups make up around 11 percent of Sudan’s population and about 25 
percent of Sudan’s livestock producers, but these figures should be taken as rough estimates given the inadequacy 
of Sudan’s censuses (see “Censuses” below). 
12 See Ibrahim (1999), Ahmed (2006), and OIE (2006). One company engaged in chicken, egg, and dairy production 
is the Arab Company for Agricultural Production and Processing, see http://www.aaaid.org/english/membercountries.htm.  
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appointed five members of the national Pastoralists Union to the National 
Assembly.  
The Pastoralists Union initiates and influences livestock policies at the 
national and state levels, but some sources stated that the union is 
politicised, politically weak, and not representative of Sudan’s poor livestock 
keepers (cf. Ali and Nimir 2003; McGrath 2001). At the national and state 
levels, the Pastoralists Union appears to function as part of the NCP apparatus 
(cf. Raziq and Ballal 2006). At the local level, however, there seems to be 
greater responsiveness in unions to the needs of poor livestock owners. 
Several sources suggested strengthening local level unions and ensuring that 
leaders are democratically elected in order to give poor livestock keepers 
greater political power and a voice in policy and project decisions that affect 
them.  
Traders and Merchants 
Traders and merchants move livestock through the commodity chain (see 
“Marketing System” below for more detailed information). Some traders are 
members of pastoral tribes who gave up livestock production to engage in 
trade. Other traders are independent small-scale traders (jelaba) or agents 
(wakils) or sub-agents for large merchants. These brokers in turn sell animals 
to export companies or butchers (for local consumption or export). Some of 
the large merchant and export companies are owned by companies based in 
Saudi Arabia or other Arab nations13 (see also “Livestock Marketing” below). 
There are also several associations of exporters, including associations for 
Meat Exporters, Live Animals Exporters and Skins and Hides exporters. These 
associations work closely with the Chamber of Commerce and are influential 
in the formulation of export-friendly policies (Aklilu 2002). 
Political Parties 
The National Congress Party (NCP) is the most powerful political force in 
contemporary Sudan. The NCP was created in 1998 out of the National Islamic 
Front (NIF), which sought an Islamic state based on shari’a law, although NCP 
has toned down its Islamic advocacy since the late 1990s (Young 2005). The 
NCP is nominally headed by President Omar Al-Bashir, although the party 
leadership wields significant power independent of Al-Bashir (ICG 2006b). The 
core support for the NCP comes from the elite of Northern riverine tribes with 
strong interests in agricultural production and trading (Young 2005), but the 
leadership of NCP includes many military leaders. The NCP is currently in 
charge of key ministries in GONU including Defense; Finance and National 
Economy; Energy and Mining; Justice; Agriculture and Forestry; and Animal 
Resources and Fisheries. The NCP also holds the office of Second Vice 
President (currently Ali Uthman Mohammed Taha) and majority status (52 
percent of seats) in the National Assembly.14    
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is the second most powerful 
political entity in Sudan. In 1983, mutinies by southerners in the Sudanese 
army led to the creation of the SPLM/A and the resumption of civil war. The 
SPLM has its main base of support in Southern Sudan but it also has 
considerable political support in Northern Sudan, as demonstrated by the 
widespread popularity of the late SPLM leader John Garang and the wartime 
alliances between the SPLM/A and opposition groups in Darfur and Eastern 
                                                 
13 One example is the Saudi-owned Gulf Livestock Company, see http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/sudan/?id=2626, site visited November 3, 2006.  
14 The NCP has minimal support in Southern Sudan, but the CPA provides for NCP minority representation in GOSS 
and the southern states (CPA 2006; EIU 2006b). 
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Sudan. In accordance with the CPA, the SPLM is accorded the First Vice 
Presidency (currently Salva Kiir); several GONU ministries including Foreign 
Affairs; minority status in the GONU National Assembly (28 percent of seats); 
Presidency of GOSS (currently Salva Kiir); and majority status in the GOSS 
legislature. The power base of the SPLM was strengthened in January 2006 
with the signing of the Juba Declaration, which integrates the well-armed 
South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) with the SPLA, which is now the official 
army of Southern Sudan15 (EIU 2006b). The ongoing crisis in Darfur has 
demonstrated the political weakness of the SPLM in the GONU, however, with 
the NCP directing the escalation of the conflict and setting national policy 
against deployment of a UN force in Darfur (ICG 2006b). 
The NCP and SPLM currently dominate Sudan’s political landscape although 
many smaller political parties and movements exist. Many opposition groups 
were organized through the Asmara-based National Democratic Alliance (NDA), 
which at its height in the mid-1990s included the SPLM, Umma Party, 
Democratic Unionist Party, Beja Congress, Rashaida Free Lions, Communist 
Party of Sudan, and other groups (ICG 2006a).16 The NDA brought together 
groups opposed to NIF and NCP, but it suffered from differences of opinion 
between Southern groups such as the SPLM and Northern groups such as the 
Umma Party17 (EIU 2006b). The NCP has skillfully exploited these differences 
over time, for example by excluding the NDA and dealing directly with the 
SPLM during the peace process that led to the CPA. Similarly, the ESPA was 
negotiated directly between NCP and the Eastern Front (the Beja Congress 
and Rashaida Free Lions; see “Eastern Sudan” below). The NDA reconciled 
with NCP in 2005, but while its members have taken up seats in the new 
National Assembly the national leadership of NDA is still negotiating with NCP 
over control of two federal ministries (Education, Science and Technology) 
and other political positions18 (EIU 2006b).  
The political situation in Darfur is complex and dynamic. Since it was founded 
in 1945, the Umma Party has been the dominant political force in Darfur. It is 
based in the Sufi Ansar movement headed by Sadiq al Mahdi, with support 
among both agricultural and pastoral tribes. The Umma Party was the 
dominant political power in Sudan during the last period of parliamentary 
democracy, heading coalition governments with the Democratic Unionist Party 
from 1986 until 1989,19 when President Al-Bashir seized power. The Umma 
Party remains strong in Western Sudan and Khartoum (especially 
Omdurman).20 The Umma Party reportedly has ties to many of the militias that 
have fought against the government since 2003 in Darfur.  
The armed opposition in Darfur consists of numerous militias that have 
changed alliances over time (Flint and de Waal 2005). The NCP-SPLM peace 
negotiations that resulted in the CPA excluded groups from Darfur, leading the 
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in 2003 to escalate a simmering 
                                                 
15 A split in the SPLM/A in 1991 mainly along ethnic lines resulted in the creation of the mostly-Nuer SSDF; the 
SPLM/A became more predominantly controlled by people of the Dinka ethnic group (Jok and Hutchinson 1999; 
HRW 2003). 
16 At its height, the number of signatories of the NDA charter reached 13 political parties and 56 unions and 
federations, armed factions, and political leaders. See http://www.ndasudan.org/, site visited October 30, 2006. 
17 The Umma Party withdrew from the NDA in 2000 (ICG 2006). See also the Umma Party’s web site, 
http://www.umma.org/English.html, site visited October 30, 2006. 
18 See “Sudanese Government, NDA resume talks,” Sudan Tribune, October 23, 2006, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18291, site visited November 1, 2006. 
19 These elections did not include Southern Sudan. The Democratic Unionist Party, “based in the Khatmiyya Muslim 
religious sect in eastern Sudan, traditionally headed by the El Mirghani family, also head of the Khatmiyya sect” 
(HRW 2003). 
20 In September 2006 the government arrested several Umma Party leaders in Khartoum for leading protests 
against reductions in government subsidies for sugar and fuel prices (ICG 2006b). 
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conflict and assert its desire for participation in the power and revenue 
sharing process (Middleton and O’Keefe 2006; Young 2005). In May 2006, only 
the Minni Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA/MM) signed the 
DPA, giving Minawi special status as an assistant to President Al-Bashir.21 In 
June 2006, several groups that did not sign the DPA formed the National 
Redemption Front (NRF). The NRF consists of: the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), “formed by factions within the SLM, by exiled dissidents and 
by Islamic fundamentalists, [which] appeared shortly after the SLM/A became 
active” (Middleton and O’Keefe 2006); several factions of the SLA, but not the 
important militia of Abdel Wahid Mohammed el-Nur (SLA/AW); and two 
leaders from the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (ICG 2006b). These groups 
and their future constellations will be part of Darfur’s post-conflict political 
landscape.  
National Assembly 
The National Assembly is the lower house of the National Legislature and 
consists of 450 members appointed by the government.22 The National 
Assembly’s Committee on Agriculture and Animal Resources develops livestock 
policies based on the input of the Ministry of Animal Resources, Pastoralists 
Union, individual members of the National Assembly, and other federal and 
state ministries. The Committee decides on a majority basis and forwards 
policy recommendations to the full Assembly where votes are decided on a 
majority basis. Bills approved by the National Assembly do not become law 
until approved by the President.  
Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries 
At independence in 1956, a separate Ministry of Animal Resources existed until 
1969, when the military regime of Jaafar Nimeiri combined it with agriculture 
and irrigation into a Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Majok and 
Schwabe 1996). Within this new ministry, livestock concerns were 
subordinated to the Nimeiri regime’s “breadbasket” strategy that focused on 
the horizontal expansion of agricultural crops. Animal Resources became 
independent again with the return of civilian rule in the mid-1980s, but in 
1989 the military regime of Omar al-Bashir re-incorporated Animal Resources 
into the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1996, however, the government created a 
separate Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (MARF).  
The Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries is responsible for controlling 
livestock diseases, regulating domestic and export trade, and formulating 
national livestock policy. It also coordinates with the state ministries of 
agriculture and animal resources on livestock issues, and posts veterinary staff 
to each state where they are under the direct supervision of the respective 
state ministry.23 The current Minister is a retired Army officer, Brig. (Rtd.) 
Galwak Deng (NCP). Several sources interviewed for this project remarked 
that MARF is inadequately funded and politically weak, particularly compared 
with the powerful Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, reflecting the historical 
dominance of crop production over livestock production in Sudan. One source 
commented on MARF’s inferiority by noting that the 2006 Green Alert 
                                                 
21 See ICG (2006b) for a discussion of concerns that SLA/MM is functioning as a paramilitary wing of the Sudanese 
military. 
22 In accordance with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, elections for the National Assembly are  owing 
to take place by 2009. The legislature also consists of the Council of States, consisting of 2 members from each 
state (52 total) who are appointed by the President. 
23 The MARF also includes the Animal Health and Disease Control General Directorate. The Directorate runs three 
departments consisting of Animal Health, Epizootic Disease Control and Veterinary Public Health (Aklilu 2002). 
MARF appoints veterinary officers to serve in the states, but these officers report simultaneously to the 
Directorate and the relevant state-level ministry. 
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Programme was developed almost entirely by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, with MARF brought into the process only three weeks before it was 
unveiled in July 2006.  
The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has created its own Ministry of 
Animal Resources and Fisheries. This fledgling ministry is understaffed (with 
just 5 people in June 2006) and struggling to establish its credibility and 
legitimacy. Increased capacity building and funding for this new ministry will 
be key to pro-poor livestock policy initiatives in Southern Sudan.  
Animal Resources Bank 
The Animal Resources Bank was created in 1993 to support the livestock sector 
in Sudan. The Bank is a private company in which the government owns 23 
percent. The Bank focuses on helping livestock traders by providing them with 
trade finance, and it also “doubles as a trading house whereby it buys 
livestock from secondary and terminal markets and sells them at cost plus 
profit to exporters under a system called [Murabaha]” (Aklilu 2002). 
The Animal Resources Bank operates two subsidiaries: the Animal Resources 
Services Company and the Animal Roads Company. The Animal Resources 
Services Company (ARSC) was also created in 1993, when the government 
privatised its predecessor, the Livestock Meat Marketing Corporation; as with 
the Bank, the government retains a twenty-three percent share of ARSC (ARSC 
2004). ARSC is responsible for the development, promotion, and modernisation 
of livestock marketing. ARSC owns and supervises 11 markets,24 which 
represent the principal livestock markets in Sudan. Herders or producers pay a 
per-head fee to enter the market. ARSC provides security at each market, and 
water, food, and veterinary care are available. ARSC also provides facilities 
for artificial insemination, supplies and distributes veterinary drugs, 
manufactures animal feed (molasses), and finances research. The Animal 
Roads Company plans to manage watering and staging points on stock routes 
as well as administer the livestock wagons currently under the control of the 
Sudan Railways Company (Aklilu 2002). 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is responsible for livestock 
research through its Animal Resources Research Corporation (ARRC). ARRC was 
created in 1995 as part of the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries; 
however, since 2001 it has been part of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. ARRC conducts research on animal diseases (with a focus on 
diseases that affect exports) and animal production (with a focus on breeding 
and nutrition). The ARRC runs several research centres including the Central 
Veterinary Research Laboratories Centre and the Animal Production Research 
Centre, which is involved in artificial insemination, breeding research, and 
programmes for managing genetic resources. ARRC is responsible for livestock 
research, but the Ministry of Animal Resources is responsible for extension 
services to transfer research findings to producers. Several sources 
interviewed for this project stated that although moving animal research back 
to MARF could improve coordination of the government’s livestock work, 
inadequate funding is the main impediment to better animal research in 
Sudan. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology also runs the Agricultural Research 
Corporation (ARC). ARC conducts crop improvement research on food, feed, 
                                                 
24 These markets are located in Darfur (El Fasher, Nyala, Al Daiein), Korofan (Kadogli, El Obeid), White Nile (Kosti, 
Rabak), Blue Nile (Sinnar), Gezeira (Wad Medani), and Khartoum (El Muwelih, Elsalam). 
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and industrial crops. It oversees sixteen research centers in northern Sudan. 
Some ARC research centers also conduct research on animal breeding, animal-
drawn farm implements, livestock feed and fodder, and forage crops (El-Hag 
et al 1998; Osman et al 2005; Ahmed and El-Hag 2004; cf. World Bank 2003). 
Other Federal Ministries 
In addition to MOST and MARF, several other GONU ministries are involved in 
livestock and/or pastoral issues.25  
• the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has great political power within the 
government and affects livestock and pastoralism through its control of 
rangelands and pasturelands, and promotion of the horizontal expansion of 
agricultural crop production.  
• the Ministry of Finance and National Economy distributes funds for the 
Ministry of Animal Resources and other ministries.  
• in accordance with the 2005 CPA, the Ministry of Justice is facilitating and 
supporting the National Land Commission process to clarify land tenure in 
northern Sudan; the Government of Southern Sudan is setting up its own 
Southern Sudan Land Commission (CPA 2005).  
• the Ministry of Environment and Tourism oversees the work of the Higher 
Council for Environment and Natural Resources, which coordinates the 
work of various federal ministries on issues of environmental protection 
and sustainable development.  
• the Ministry of Foreign Trade issues livestock export licenses and puts 
minimum levels (called minimum indicative prices) on the export price of 
livestock and meat. It also chairs the Live Animals and Meat Export 
Promotion Council, composed mainly of exporters, to promote livestock 
exports (Aklilu 2002).  
• the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources sets national policies for 
irrigation, water storage, and water delivery. 
These ministries have counterparts in GOSS, although not all GOSS ministries 
are fully functioning. 
State Governments 
There are 26 states in Sudan: 10 in Southern Sudan and 16 in the North. Each 
state government has an executive branch (Governor and Council of 
Ministers), legislative branch (State Legislature), and judicial branch (State 
Judiciary) (CPA 2005). The executive branch includes ministries roughly based 
on the federal ministry system. State ministries are responsible for 
implementing federal policies as well as developing their own state-specific 
policies and programmes. The livestock sector primary falls under the state-
level Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources, and Irrigation, which has 
responsibility for range and pasturelands and coordinates veterinary work with 
the federal MARF. State ministries are in general severely constrained by a 
lack of financial resources, facilities and equipment. States obtain some of 
their revenue from fees and taxes levied at livestock markets, but this may 
negatively affect efforts to promote exports (Aklilu 2002). 
                                                 
25 Other ministries that work with pastoralists include the Ministries of Education, Health, Justice, and Social 
Care.  
  13
International and Local Organizations 
International and local organizations directly and indirectly address issues 
affecting livestock and livestock keepers. International groups (governmental 
and non-governmental) provide important technical assistance and service 
delivery in Sudan. International organizations and financial institutions also 
supply significant funding for reconstruction and development.26 Organizations 
working directly on livestock and pastoral issues include the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development Programme, 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, CHF International, and 
Veterinarians without Borders (see further discussion in “Role of International 
Organizations” below). Local non-governmental organizations also provide 
services and engage in development projects. Some groups, such as the 
Environmentalists Society, are involved in conflict resolution efforts and land 
tenure policy. In February 2006 the Sudanese government passed a new law 
regulating non-governmental organizations; this law could silence or exclude 
donors, international and local NGOs that are critical of government policies 
and practices (HRW 2006); however, this law and its potential impacts are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
                                                 
26 The World Bank (2006a) notes: “Out of a total of US$4.5 billion [in foreign aid] pledged through 2007, about 38 
percent has so far been reported. Overall reported assistance to the Sudan has increased significantly, from 
US$383 million in 2003 to over US$1.7 billion in 2005. While this was significantly driven by increased humanitarian 
assistance to Darfur, which peaked at US$890 million in 2004, assistance to Southern Sudan rose to US$680 million 
in 2005, with large shares of humanitarian and recovery support, alongside an increase in development 
assistance.” 
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PART II: KEY ISSUES 
Land Tenure 
Changes in land tenure over the last two centuries have caused massive 
displacement, livelihood disruption, and civil conflict. Land theft and 
conversion of communal or smallholder land to private property started during 
the period of Turko-Egyptian rule (1820-1883). During the Condominium period 
(1898-1956), the British focus on large-scale crop production schemes resulted 
in large-scale population displacement and land enclosures, particularly in 
central and eastern Sudan.  
Since independence, successive governments including the current NCP regime 
have continued colonial-era land seizures and development projects focused 
on horizontal expansion of agricultural production. As noted by Justice Africa 
(2002): 
The current situation in many rural areas, especially Nuba Mountains, 
Southern Blue Nile and Northern Upper Nile, is that large tracts of land have 
been confiscated by commercial farmers with the support of the [NCP] 
government. No accurate statistics exist for the extent of large-scale land 
confiscation, because many mechanised farms have been set up or expanded 
on an opportunistic basis without formal registration, and because some of the 
allocations have been made in secret. 
Government land policies—often developed and implemented with 
international technical assistance and funding—have eroded customary land 
rights, displaced hundreds of thousands of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, 
and led directly to armed conflicts.  
Government legislation regulating land and other natural resources has 
favoured individual rights over community rights, promoted commercial crop 
production over traditional land use systems (especially grazing), and 
represented national political and economic agendas over local interests (De 
Wit 2001).   
Competition over land use has existed for centuries in Sudan, but public and 
private sector actions during the last two centuries have transformed 
intermittent low-level conflict into chronic severe conflict. Recent land use-
related conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan are not simply “old wine in 
new bottles” (De Wit et al 2005), but rather the result of complex changes in 
social and political power relations between groups over time. Social and 
political power shifts have combined with other factors such as increasing 
human and livestock populations, the discovery of oil, declining rainfall in 
semi-arid zones, and the proliferation of guns to make contemporary conflict 
in Sudan extremely destructive and difficult to resolve.   
The importance of land tenure is reflected in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. The CPA provided for the 
creation of a National Land Commission and Southern Sudan Land Commission, 
plus two state level commissions in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Abyei 
Boundaries Commission). These commissions will arbitrate land conflicts, 
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assess compensation, and develop new land policies and laws27 (De Wit et al 
2005; CPA 2005). The DPA also creates a Land Commission to ensure that the 
rights of refugees and IDPs to their land are properly respected, although the 
status of this commission is in doubt given the escalation of conflict in late 
2006. These land commissions present an opportunity for pro-poor livestock 
policy initiatives, but the highly politicised issue of land tenure presents a 
constraint to the success of meaningful pro-poor interventions.  
The Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) exemplifies the problems facing the 
Land Commission process and land tenure in general. The CPA includes a 
special agreement on Abyei that allows for a referendum to be held 
simultaneously with the 2011 southern referendum, on whether to remain part 
of the North or join the South (including an independent Southern Sudan) (ICG 
2006a). The process was complicated  owing to the massive displacement of 
native Ngok Dinka populations and claims of land rights by Misseriya 
transhumants. The ABC delivered its report to the Presidency in July 2006, but 
the report was rejected by the ruling National Congress Party. As noted by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2006), “the SPLM demands that Khartoum should 
accept the results of the ABC, [but] the [NCP] would prefer to define the 
region’s boundary in such a way as to exclude the oil-fields in the north of the 
province.” The dispute over ABC is negatively affecting relations between the 
SPLM and NCP and progress on other aspects of the CPA (ICG 2006a; EIU 
2006a). 
International donors and organizations participating in the Land Commission 
process need to ensure the participation of marginalised populations. Given 
that the GONU currently seeks to “settle the nomads” in Sudan, the Land 
Commissions will need to pay special attention to the needs and desires of 
nomadic groups if they are to be adequately protected. Formal, legal land 
tenure threatens the future of nomadic life in Sudan, for example by 
eliminating access to migratory routes and rangelands. Land Commissions 
ideally will seek guidance from nomadic groups and include them in the 
development and implementation of policies and laws to the greatest extent 
possible. Good process would involve the Land Commission's holding public 
meetings in rural areas with migratory pastoralists to both inform local 
populations about the Commissions’ work and seek the input and involvement 
of local populations. The issue of women’s rights is also significant, given that 
women are prohibited from owning land under many customary legal systems. 
Special outreach efforts to nomads and women need to include legal 
information and perhaps legal aid (cf. Polloni 2005).  
As part of the Land Commission process, there could also be a re-evaluation of 
past land seizures and current land policies and laws, conducted either by the 
Commissions themselves or by international organizations and donors. 
According to Justice Africa (2002), “Some mechanised farms in Kordofan, Blue 
Nile and elsewhere have expanded beyond the registered area, or not been 
registered at all.” In these cases, government legislation could order the 
return of seized land to the rightful owners or prior occupants, with due 
consideration to customary law and land rights. New legislation could reverse 
the 1990 Amendment to the Civil Transactions Act that prohibited appeal 
against land adjudications and seizures made by the government. 
International organizations and donors should encourage GONU and GOSS to 
extend legal land rights (including rights to pasture/rangeland and water 
points) to the Sudanese poor. De Wit (2001) recommends participatory land 
use planning at all levels of government and increasing the capacity of state 
and provincial/county agencies for land planning and management. 
                                                 
27 As of October 2006, the National Land Commission had not been established. The Southern Land Commission has 
been appointed but is not yet functioning. 
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Land tenure issues, particularly as they involve pastoralists, are common 
among the IGAD counties and consistently involve deeply entrenched and 
powerful interests at the national level. One possible way to introduce new 
considerations into the debate and change its dynamics would be to address 
them in an IGAD-wide study and member-nation conference, organized by the 
LPI. 
Green Alert Programme 
In June 2006, the NCP unveiled the Green Alert Programme (aka Green 
Mobilisation) to promote the development of the agricultural and livestock 
sector in Sudan (MAF 2006). After NCP developed the programme, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forests and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
presented it to President Al-Bashir and the Council of Ministers, which 
approved it (Abu Saif 2006). The Green Alert Programme calls for 313 billion 
SD ($US 1.4 billion) in expenditures between 2006 and 2010, with 60 percent 
coming from public sources and 40 percent from banks.28 Including public and 
private funding, the Green Alert Programme allocates 56 percent of funds for 
irrigated and mechanised rain-fed agriculture, 37 percent for animal 
production, and the remaining 7 percent for forests, support for State 
Agricultural Administrations, pest control, research centers, seed production 
centers, and training centers.  
The programme for the “Animal Wealth Sector” seeks to achieve increased 
animal production through the individual and cooperative efforts of the MARF, 
state ministries, banks, and private sector companies. The five categories 
budgeted to receive the largest amounts of public and private funds are:29 
• opening livestock tracks, broadcasting of pasture seeds and opening of fire 
lines: 20 billion SD ($US 91.7 million30) in public funds 
• establishment of range farms and ranches for fattening: 16.6 billion SD 
($US 76.1 million) in private funds 
• establishment of slaughterhouse and quarantine centers: 15.5 billion SD 
($US 71.1 million) in public and private funds 
• settlement of moving herders: 15 billion SD ($US 68.8 million) in public 
funds 
• financing of veterinary drugs manufacture: 13.5 billion SD ($US 61.9 
million) in public and private funds 
Other programmes of note include: 
• mobile veterinary clinics: 10 billion SD ($US 45.9 million) in public funds 
• improving of milk industries: 5 billion SD ($US 23 million) in private funds 
• construction of haffirs, bore wells and earth dams in the livestock raising 
areas: 3.4 billion SD ($US 15.5 million) in public funds 
• cultivation and processing of forages: 3.4 billion SD ($US 15.5 million) in 
private funds 
                                                 
28 The programme calls for 59 percent of government funding over the period 2006-2010 to go to irrigated and 
mechanized rain-fed agriculture, with 31 percent of government funding to support animal production (excluding 
fish). The programme calls for 50 percent of bank funds over the period 2006-2010 to go to irrigated and 
mechanized rain-fed agriculture, with 41 percent of bank funds to support animal production (excluding fish). 
29 Figures are for the period 2006-2010. 
30 Calculated at a rate of 1 $US=218 SD (July 2006 rate).  
  17
• poultry production: 2 billion SD ($US 9.2 million) in private funds 
• study of constructing water canals across the national pastoral collections: 
500,000 SD ($US 2.3 million) in public funds 
GONU is now seeking the assistance of international organizations, donors, and 
companies to implement the Green Alert Programme.  
The focus of the Green Alert Programme is on increasing crop production. To 
accomplish this, the programme calls for greater productivity but provides for 
massive horizontal expansion of land under cultivation. It plans to increase by 
50 percent the area under cultivation by traditional rain-fed farming, 
traditional irrigated farming,31 and the White Nile, Blue Nile, and River Nile 
irrigated schemes. The programme will start the recovery of mechanised rain-
fed agricultural production in the Nuba Mountains, focused on cotton 
production. The programme also lists as an objective the “introduction of 
livestock raising [for rain-fed traditional farming] to increase the farmers 
income” (MAF 2006).   
The Green Alert Programme includes projects for Southern Sudan, which will 
be carried out by GONU in collaboration with GOSS (MAF 2006): 
• establishment of pilot farms to maintain food [self-sufficiency] instead of 
relying on relief. 
• assessment of the current national schemes in the South with the aim of 
revitalising them. 
• assessing the possibility of establishing new schemes along the rivers and 
the rain fed farming potentialities in the South to produce food. 
• production of tropical crops such as cotton, tea, coffee and other 
horticultural products. 
• study the possibility of promoting livestock production in the South. 
The amount of money to be spent on these projects is unclear in the planning 
document. The only South-specific entry is for the “Study of the agricultural 
projects in South Sudan,” which is budgeted for 230 million SD ($US 1.06 
million) over the period 2006-2010. 
Overall, the Green Alert Programme looks much like the development plans of 
old which sought to expand large-scale commercial and mechanised crop 
production at the expense of livestock owners and pastoral livelihoods (cf. De 
Wit 2001). The Green Alert Programme reflects the historical dominance of 
agricultural crop production for the Sudanese economy, but it also supports 
agricultural and trading interests within the National Congress Party.32 One 
source interviewed for this project described the Green Alert as simply a 
restatement of earlier programmes that focused on crop production and 
neglected livestock production. This source also questioned whether the 
states have the capacity to implement the Green Alert’s programmes. Another 
source described the Green Alert Programme as “political” and “just words.”   
 
                                                 
31 This is farming for which water for irrigation is supplied by floods, basins, small pumps, haffirs, and bore wells. 
32 For example, the Arab Authority for Investment and International Development (AAIID) has partial ownership in 
several parastatals in Sudan, including agricultural projects in White Nile and Blue Nile states that will benefit 
from the Green Alert Programme. AAIID also has a stake in poultry and milk production companies, which are also 
targeted for expansion under the Green Alert Programme. On AAIID’s Board of Shareholders sits H.E. Mr. AL Zubeir 
Ahmed Hassan (Minister of Finance and National Economy, Sudan); on the Board of Directors of AAIID sits H.E. Dr. 
Hassan Ahmed Taha (Under Secretary to the Minister of Finance and National Economy, Sudan) (AAIID 2005). See 
the list of Agricultural Projects posted by the Sudanese Ministry of Investment at http://www.sudaninvest.org/, site 
visited November 3, 2006. 
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The programme for the Animal Wealth Sector is designed to increase livestock 
production to meet domestic demand and increase exports of livestock and 
livestock products. Several aspects of the programme could benefit poor 
livestock owners, such as expansion of mobile veterinary clinics and 
incorporation of livestock foraging into crop production schemes.33 However, 
other parts of the programme raise serious questions about the effects they 
will have on poor livestock owners. For example, the creation of private 
sector ranches could accelerate the trend of concentrated livestock ownership 
and potentially turn poor livestock keepers into wage laborers (cf. Duffield 
2002). Green Alert places a strong emphasis on private sector development in 
the livestock sector, for example through support for industrial poultry and 
milk production, which could limit the entry of small-scale or community-
driven projects into the marketing system. Private sector fodder production 
will provide fodder for livestock keepers during the dry season, but this may 
require livestock keepers who are accustomed to free access to rangelands 
and pasture to now pay for animal feed. The resurrection of the Jonglei canal 
project within the Green Alert Programme could have profound implications 
for pastoral livelihoods in Southern Sudan (Willow 2006), and its effects should 
be carefully evaluated and addressed before this project moves forward. 
Finally, the plan to settle the nomads raises numerous questions about the 
social, political, economic, and environmental effects of such a scheme (see 
“Settling the Nomads” below). 
The Green Alert Programme appears to be a continuation of past development 
policies that claimed they would help poor livestock owners but marginalised 
them instead. International organizations and financial institutions should 
carefully review the details of projects they are asked to support or 
participate in—such as the settlement of nomads—to consider the likely 
impacts on poor and vulnerable populations. More specifically, international 
organizations and funders should consider making their money or technical 
assistance contingent upon participatory involvement of nomads and other 
affected poor livestock owners in the design and implementation of Green 
Alert projects.  
As with land tenure issues, the issue of sedentarisation of pastoralists is 
common to most of the IGAD countries. The one thing that all IGAD countries 
have is pastoralists and it was that feature that led to the initial creation of 
IGAD. The sedentarisation issue therefore probably is best addressed in an LPI-
organized IGAD-wide forum.  
Settling the Nomads 
One of the long-standing controversies in Sudan is over plans to “settle the 
nomads.” The censuses of 1955 and 1976 estimated the nomadic population at 
about 11-13 percent of Sudan’s total population, concentrated most heavily in 
Darfur, Kordofan, and Kassala (Khogali 1979; cf. Ahmed 2002). Nomads are 
generally considered to be constantly on the move with their animals, but 
Morton (2005) notes: 
The division between settled and nomad is largely false. There is a continuous 
spectrum between those who are wholly dependent on cultivation and those 
wholly dependent on livestock. Only a few are at either end of the spectrum. 
The majority are somewhere in the middle.  
                                                 
33 Although the Green Alert Programme provides for creating water points, it is not clear if these water points 
would be located along migratory routes or routes traveled by traders and herders on their way to markets. 
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In the last few decades, many people classified as nomads in Sudan have 
“voluntarily” settled as a result of drought (esp. the 1984-85 drought), 
conflict, or new economic opportunities (Morton 2005; Khogali 1979). Some 
have pursued wage labor in cities or on farms, while others have retained 
livestock but also taken up small-scale agriculture or engaged in trade.  
The desire to settle migratory pastoralists has been directly or indirectly 
expressed for decades in Sudan’s development projects. Some development 
schemes pursued by the government (with international assistance) expressly 
sought to settle nomads (Thimm 1979; Khogali 1979), while others 
intentionally displaced nomads from rangelands or migratory routes to 
facilitate urbanization or crop production (Ahmed 2002; Majok and Schwabe 
1996; Johnson 2003). Nomads who chose not to settle were able to adapt, but 
some were forced to take their animals to areas unsuited for grazing and then 
blamed for overgrazing and desertification (Ahmed 2002).  
The issues of overgrazing and desertification have been inadequately studied 
in Sudan and the causes of desertification are subject to debate and 
interpretation. Episodic drought, the southward drift of isohyets, fires, and 
deforestation are cited as causes, but pastoralism is often singled out for 
blame (cf. Mensching 1979). The drilling of boreholes to provide drinking 
water for human and livestock populations has caused degradation and 
desertification in some areas (Ibrahim 1993), but these boreholes were drilled 
as part of poorly-planned development projects and their effects cannot be 
simply blamed on either livestock keepers or pastoralism. A study by Turner 
(1998) on desertification in Sahelian landscapes found that inter-annual 
fluctuations in rainfall are more significant than anthropogenic degradation, 
and that Sahelian annual rangelands are generally less fragile and more 
resilient to grazing than commonly assumed. A study by Babiker (1982) 
describes the role of urbanization in causing desertification through the 
unsustainable harvesting of wood to satisfy urban demand. The increases in 
the human and livestock populations34 during the last few decades have 
undoubtedly had effects on grasslands, but desertification is a complex issue 
that has become politicised as the government seeks rationalisations for 
policies that marginalise pastoral populations, privatise rangelands and 
pasture, and appropriate surpluses from livestock production (cf. Blaikie 
1985). 
The desire to settle the nomads stems not only from a desire to control the 
lands they use, but also from a perception that the nomadic lifestyle is 
“backward and irrational” (cf. Ahmed 2002). In arguing in favour of settling 
nomads, Khogali (1979) claims that “nomadism has several important 
disadvantages, such as extensive and destructive use of natural resources, 
inefficient use of human resources, and a marked inability to use social 
services.” This belief is reflected in the government’s 2006-2010 Green Alert 
Programme, which provides government funds for the “settlement of moving 
herders” to achieve the “rational utilization of the animal wealth” and 
“provision of the essential services to the pastoralists” (MAF 2006).   
Plans to settle nomads are couched in the language of modernisation and 
development, but coercive efforts to settle people by privatising pastures and 
converting them to large-scale crop production may have unforeseen social 
and economic effects. Some nomads wish to settle and will voluntary do so 
when social services are provided to them (Khogali 1979), but without the 
participation of nomadic populations in the design and implementation of 
development projects, the voluntary nature of settlement may simply be a 
myth: nomads will be forced to settle in order to survive. The government and 
                                                 
34 See Annex A for information about the increases in Sudan’s livestock populations. 
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its international partners in the Green Alert Programme should re-evaluate 
current plans to settle nomads until the nomads’ needs and desires are taken 
into consideration. This could be accomplished through direct consultation 
and participatory involvement with nomadic populations, or through the 
creation of grassroots-oriented pastoralists unions that can give voice to 
nomadic and transhumant knowledge about current conditions and new 
development strategies. International organizations supporting the Green 
Alert Programme, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, could make 
their assistance contingent upon the greater participatory involvement of 
nomadic populations in government planning and project implementation. 
Censuses 
There is an urgent need to ascertain the human and livestock populations and 
survey the status of natural resources in Sudan. Decades of conflict, large-
scale development projects, and recurrent drought have forced millions of 
people to migrate within Sudan or to neighboring countries. These same 
factors have resulted in the theft, death, dispersal, or transfer of ownership 
of innumerable livestock. Conflict, development, and drought have also 
caused degradation and destruction of natural resources, including rangelands 
and pasturelands. The result is an incomplete and inaccurate understanding of 
Sudan’s human population, livestock numbers, and natural resource 
conditions.  
Estimates of Sudan’s current human population range from 36.2 million to 
41.2 million people (World Bank 2006; UNFPA 2006; CIA 2006). There are 
between five hundred and six hundred ethnic groups in Sudan (Middleton and 
O’Keefe 2006). As part of the CPA, in 2007 Sudan will undertake a new 
national population census (CPA 2005). The census faces many obstacles, 
however, including insecurity, shifting populations, poor infrastructure, and 
lack of staff experience in conducting population surveys (USAID 2006). The 
results of the census will help determine political representation and civil 
service participation at the national level (CPA 2005), but by providing data on 
occupations and place of habitation, the results will also inform policy 
interventions and development projects for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists 
(cf. Sudan Vision 2006). The two governmental agencies undertaking 
censuses35 and the international donors and agencies assisting them (e.g. 
USAID, UNFPA, World Bank) need to ensure that adequate resources are 
devoted to the censuses, that surveys make special efforts to count nomadic 
or transhumant populations, and that pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are 
accurately coded to identify the total population of Sudan reliant upon 
livestock for their livelihoods.  
The last national livestock census in Sudan was conducted in 1976. The Sudan 
National Livestock Census and Resource Survey used aerial surveys to estimate 
livestock numbers and distribution; concurrent household surveys provided 
additional information about livestock populations and diseases (Morton 2005). 
Since the 1970s, additional livestock (and resource) surveys were conducted of 
specific regions or localities, particularly those targeted for development 
(Wilson 1979; Morton 2005). Since the early 1980s, recurrent drought and 
persistent conflict have significantly disrupted livestock and human 
populations, leading to millions of premature deaths, massive population 
shifts, and new migratory routes.  
                                                 
35 The Southern Sudan Center for Censuses, Statistics and Evaluation will undertake the census in Southern Sudan, 
and the Central Bureau of Statistics will undertake the census in the rest of the country. 
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Although increased veterinary services during the last two decades have 
reportedly increased livestock survivability and herd sizes, the lack of a 
comprehensive national census is a constraint upon effective policy and 
technical intervention. Sudan’s Animal Resources Services Corporation and 
Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries produce annual estimates of 
livestock populations (ARSC 2004), but the official figures (topping 130 million 
in 2003 for cattle, sheep, goats, and camels) are believed to be optimistic; 
several interviewees estimated the government numbers may be 15-25 
percent too high.  
The Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries is helping to plan a new 
national livestock census in 2007, but the lack of security in many parts of 
Sudan may limit the conduct of fair, credible and legitimate assessments. In 
addition, the highly politicised nature of livestock in areas subjected to cattle 
theft and population displacement could potentially affect the process and 
outcomes of a census conducted by the national government. Censuses could 
provide valuable information about livestock numbers, distribution, 
ownership, management, and production systems, but in areas experiencing or 
emerging from conflict, censuses may serve to create “facts” that legitimate 
past land or animal seizures.36 
One source interviewed for this paper cited the urgent need for a “land 
census” to determine the current status and size of pasturelands, rangelands, 
migratory routes, and trade routes. The 1976 national census included surveys 
of vegetation, geomorphology, soils, drainage, topography and use (Morton 
2005), and subsequent surveys have used a variety of techniques including 
satellite imagery analysis to evaluate terrestrial conditions (Wilson 1979). The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) conducted a national 
environmental assessment during 2005-2006, but the findings and specificity 
of this work could not be determined by the author as of February 2007. Given 
the persistence of conflict in large parts of Sudan, efforts to evaluate the 
status of natural resources and land use may be incomplete and lack on-the-
ground verification of imagery analysis. Peace presents an opportunity for a 
long-overdue national assessment of natural resources and land uses, but 
conflict acts as a constraint. 
Marketing System 
The livestock marketing system starts with the primary producer and moves 
through various stages of middlemen to wholesale, retail, and export outlets. 
Sudan’s major livestock markets (except Kosti) operate on a “silent auction” 
system whereby the price for livestock is negotiated by a broker who 
communicates separately with a buyer and seller. Animals are sold by group 
prices (not by weight), and the purchase price is known only to the buyer, 
seller, and broker (ARSC 2004; Aklilu 2002). Supplies at terminal markets vary 
seasonally and are affected by armed conflict, environmental conditions, and 
political instability. Major production areas are generally 600-1,400 km from 
terminal markets, to which livestock are transported on hoof, by truck, or on 
rail. The primary producer may receive as little as one-eighth of the export 
(free on board) price (World Bank 2003; cf. Morton 2005). 
                                                 
36 Some reviewers of this report believe it is important to move forward with the censuses despite the persistence 
of conflict, because they believe that censuses would assist in better planning and funds allocation and 
consequently sound development projects that will hasten the peace processes in conflict areas. 
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The marketing system in Sudan is dominated by middlemen (brokers). Aklilu 
(2002) describes the commodity chain: 
Some of these brokers may work as independent small-scale traders (Jelaba) 
and some as agents (wakils) or sub-agents for the big traders. The brokers 
collect cattle and [small ruminants] from the scattered villages and sell them 
to another broker in the primary markets. The second broker may sell to a 
third broker in the same market or in a secondary market and this process 
goes on until the livestock are bulked into larger lots and reach the terminal 
markets. The final transaction in the terminal markets is also processed 
through brokers. Agents or sub-agents also organize the trekking of cattle to 
the terminal markets for the big traders. Livestock are said to change hands a 
minimum of two and a maximum of six times between points of purchase and 
the final point of sale.  
At the final point of sale, animals are transported to Port Sudan for live export 
or slaughtered for domestic consumption or export.37 
The role of middlemen is widely perceived as a weakness in Sudan’s marketing 
system, hurting producers, consumers, and exporters alike. Producers 
generally sell when they need cash, but under the current marketing system 
payments to producers are often deferred. Traders and brokers pass the risks 
of livestock sales to producers, who are paid only after a final sale, but 
sometimes not at all (Aklilu 2002). Producers also may lack information about 
prices at the terminal market or internationally that could inform their 
decisions to sell animals. Consumers are believed to suffer because 
middlemen (and taxes) are blamed for unnecessarily increasing the cost of 
meat in livestock-rich Sudan.38 Exporters reportedly suffer when middlemen 
drive the cost of livestock close to the international price, thereby cutting 
into the exporters’ profits. 
In addition to middlemen, large traders also distort the livestock marketing 
system. As noted by The World Bank (2003): 
Five major traders have traditionally dominated the terminal livestock 
markets in Sudan. While this is typical of many livestock markets in the world, 
the government’s recent decision to give export authority for Sudan’s trade 
with Gulf countries to only one trader has changed substantially the dynamics 
of both the domestic and export trade to the detriment of the producer 
because competition for export quality animals has been weakened. This 
change in the export marketing arrangements for livestock to Sudan’s main 
customers from a competitive one to a monopoly will have immediate and 
long-term detrimental effects on Sudan’s livestock producers and cannot be 
justified on any basis. Those who will suffer most will be the poorer small-
scale producers. 
The government’s decision to invest control of the export of Sudanese 
livestock to the Arabian peninsula in one firm39 is part of a broader 
government-led restructuring of export firms following the 2000-2001 collapse 
of Sudanese livestock exports.40  
                                                 
37 For a more detailed description of the marketing system in Sudan see Aklilu (2002); marketing in Darfur is 
described in Monec (2003), Young (2005) and Morton (2005). 
38 According to prices of consumer goods listed daily in the Sudan Tribune, during June-August 2006 the price of a 
kilo lamb meat ranged from 1,250-1,500 Sudanese Dinars (SD); the price of a kilo of beef ranged from 900-1,200 
SD. The exchange rate in June was $U.S. 1=221 SD; in August the rate slid to $U.S. 1=215 SD. The rate in $U.S. was 
therefore roughly $5.75 to $6.90 for a kilo (2.2 lbs.) of lamb meat and $4-$5.50 for a kilo (2.2 lbs.) of beef. 
39 This is the Gulf Livestock Company owned by Saudi Prince Al Waleed bin Talal (Africa Analysis 2002). 
40 In the last several years the Government of Sudan imprisoned owners of some Sudanese export companies, 
reportedly for failure to pay debts. This led to a sharp reduction of export companies operating in Sudan, from 25 
to 12 by 2002. The Government previously set minimum indicative prices for livestock export prices  owing to 
concern that export companies were under-reporting export prices (Aklilu et al 2002).  
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In the last decade the government has sought to increase exports of livestock 
and livestock products.41 Sudan’s livestock exports fell dramatically in 2000-
2001,42 however, when Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries temporarily 
banned imports of live animals from Sudan (World Bank 2003; ARSC 2004). 
Since 2002 Sudan’s livestock exports have rebounded, but they constitute a 
smaller part of non-oil exports than during the 1990s (cf. Aklilu 2002; World 
Bank 2003). Oil currently dominates Sudan’s exports. In 2005, oil accounted 
for 82 percent of Sudan’s total exports by value; livestock and livestock 
products were just 3.2 percent of exports by value (or nearly 18 percent by 
value of non-oil exports)43 (Central Bank of Sudan 2005).  
In 2003 President Al-Bashir issued a set of directives to spur livestock exports, 
putting the Ministry of Foreign Trade in charge of re-organizing and improving 
Sudan’s livestock markets. In November 2003 the Ministry directed the 
creation of a pilot Cattle Auction Project at El Muwelih market in Omdurman 
(ARSC undated). This project would require payment in cash at the time of 
transaction and sale by weight and open auction, theoretically improving the 
overall efficiency and transparency of the marketing system (ARSC 2004). If 
the project succeeds at El Muwelih it will be replicated at other livestock 
markets, but for now, the auction project is stalled  owing to problems in 
organizing financial services to facilitate cash payments (ARSC undated). 
The implications of improved market facilities, open auctions, and increased 
exports for poor livestock owners have been inadequately studied. Overall the 
changes in the livestock marketing system appear designed to give the 
government increased control over markets and transactions. More exports 
mean more revenue for the government, but it is not clear that this will 
actually lead to higher prices and livelihood security for primary producers. In 
addition, the control of the marketing system by a few firms adversely affects 
poor livestock producers. Pro-poor initiatives could include legislation to 
break the monopoly of the few trading firms currently controlling the 
domestic and export markets. Another initiative could be the establishment of 
communication networks that could provide rural populations with information 
about prices at secondary or terminal markets. In addition, the proposed 
auction system could result in greater security and profit for primary 
producers; however there should be a diligent study of its actual effects—
particularly for poor producers—before the auction system is extended to 
other markets. These marketing issues are not unique to Sudan and an IGAD-
wide study of them by the LPI might be an effective and acceptable entry-
point. 
Taxes and Fees 
Taxes and fees on livestock are levied throughout the marketing chain, from 
the village level all the way to the terminal markets. At the village level, 
annual per-head livestock taxes are collected by local leaders at different 
rates for different classes of stock (Morton 2005; Aklilu 2002). These taxes are 
an important source of revenue for local-level governments. When livestock 
are sold by primary producers and enter the commodity chain, twenty or more 
taxes and fees may be levied before they reach terminal markets in Khartoum 
                                                 
41 In the government reports reviewed for this project, there was contradictory information about livestock and 
meat exports as well as local consumption, making comparisons and analysis difficult (ARSC 2001; ARSC 2004). 
42 Exports of live animals and meat fell from US$114 million in 1999 to US$24 million in 2001 (World Bank 2003). 
43 Live animals were 13.1 percent of non-oil exports by value, meat was 2.1 percent, and hides and skins were 2.5 
percent. 
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or Port Sudan (Aklilu 2002; cf. Williams 1990). These taxes and fees combined 
with successive price mark-ups by brokers and traders may make export (free 
on board) prices up to eight times the amount the primary producer received 
(World Bank 2003; cf. Morton 2005; MONEC 2003). In some cases these taxes 
or fees are used to pay for services, such as for veterinary care or water 
access and grazing (Morton 2005; Aklilu 2002), but some sources and traders 
interviewed for this paper report that fees (money or in-kind livestock) are 
sometimes collected to ensure safe passage through an area in a form of 
extortion. Taxes on traders and exporters affect the producer price and 
export markets,44 and could therefore be reformed by the National Assembly 
to become pro-poor (Williams 1990; Morton 2005). 
Some sources interviewed for this paper suggested that increasing the per-
head tax paid by primary producers would lead to increased off-take, thereby 
reducing the price of meat domestically and helping to address problems 
associated with perceived overstocking. This proposal has theoretical merit, 
but in reality increasing taxes on livestock owners could also cause serious 
problems, for example by upsetting cultural traditions that value large herd 
sizes or reducing the economic security of households that use livestock as a 
source of wealth. The feasibility of collecting these taxes is also uncertain 
considering the history of tax evasion at the local level  owing to 
underreporting of herd sizes. Increased taxes on primary producers are 
imprudent until there is further study of the social and political effects of new 
taxes, a census of livestock, and an assessment of Sudan’s natural resources 
(cf. Morton 2005).  
Disease Control 
Livestock disease control in Sudan is challenging  owing to the sheer size of 
the country, the ease of border crossings with neighboring countries, the size 
of the livestock populations, and the difficulty of reaching migratory 
populations. For Sudan’s main livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, camels), disease 
control efforts are focused on vaccination, screening at quarantine centers 
prior to export, and training of community animal health workers (CAHWs) 
who administer drugs and vaccines on a fee-recovery basis. The federal 
government retains responsibility for controlling infectious diseases and states 
are responsible for control of general diseases. The federal government 
produces and distributes vaccines but the private sector provides animal 
medicines.  
Disease control efforts in Sudan are largely conducted and/or funded by 
international organizations (e.g. FAO, UNICEF, VSF) and local non-
governmental organizations, with the cooperation of the government. The 
Sudanese government coordinates its disease control efforts through the 
Animal Health and Disease Control General Directorate, which is 
administratively under the Ministry of Animal Resources but receives funding 
and support directly from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (Aklilu 2002). One noteworthy success of recent government 
and international disease control efforts is the eradication of rinderpest from 
Sudan (OIE 2006c; cf. Catley and Leyland 2001).  
                                                 
44 Since 2002 the Ministry of Finance has suspended export taxes for live animal and meat exports (Aklilu et al 
2002). The Ministry continues to levy a 15 percent tax on raw skins and hides and a 2-3 percent export tax on semi-
processed skins and hides (Morton 2005; cf. MOF undated). 
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Several sources noted that  owing to institutional and funding constraints as 
well as misallocation of funds and corruption, the Sudanese government is 
unable to respond to all disease outbreaks. When outbreaks occur the 
diagnosis is usually based on clinical findings but not confirmed by laboratory 
diagnosis. In addition, disease control efforts are focused on economically-
damaging outbreaks, such as rinderpest and avian flu, which attract 
international funding and technical assistance.  
The government is in the midst of a three-year programme providing free 
vaccines for livestock, but the programme is plagued by problems including 
inadequate vaccine supplies. Sources interviewed expressed different views 
about the wisdom of continuing the government’s free vaccination 
programme. Some sources argued this policy would help poor livestock 
owners, while others argued that livestock keepers would become dependant 
on free vaccines and refuse to pay for them when the programme ends in 
2007. The free vaccine policy was created by a decree from President Al-
Bashir, but the future of free vaccines should be studied and discussed by a 
broader audience, including poor livestock owners.   
In 2006, avian influenza (H5N1 strain) emerged as a serious concern in Sudan. 
In March 2006 the first cases of avian influenza were confirmed near 
Khartoum, leading to the culling of over 100,000 chickens from large poultry 
farms around the capital45 (OIE 2006a; Sudan Tribune 4/24/06). In September 
2006, avian flu was confirmed in chickens and ducks in Juba in South Sudan, 
leading the South Sudan Ministry of Animal Resources to ban live birds from 
being taken out of Juba (OIE 2006b; Sudan Tribune 9/20/06). The outbreak 
and spread of avian flu in Sudan could have profound implications for poor 
households throughout Sudan. The deaths of large numbers of poultry  owing 
to disease or culling for control purposes would deprive already impoverished 
populations in Sudan of an important source of dietary protein (WHO 2005). 
International organizations are working with government agencies to address 
avian flu, but special attention should be paid to monitoring and outreach for 
Sudan’s non-industrial poultry producers, i.e. those living in displaced persons 
camps, rural areas, and cities and towns. 
Aside from the spread of avian flu, perhaps the most serious disease control 
challenge facing Sudan today is insecurity in pastoral areas, which limits 
vaccination efforts, disease surveillance, and monitoring of livestock moving 
across international boundaries. While insecurity is a constraint, peace offers 
an opportunity for improved disease control efforts. Policies that promote the 
training and support of CAHWs should be encouraged, particularly for 
populations and areas where displaced persons are returning to their 
homelands. Several interviewees suggested that there should be greater 
oversight of CAHWs, perhaps by having them supervised by veterinary doctors. 
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War 
Landmines (anti-personnel and anti-tank mines) and explosive remnants of 
war (unexploded ordnance and abandoned ordnance) threaten the lives and 
livelihoods of poor pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Sudan. There has been 
no comprehensive survey of affected areas, but mines and explosive remnants 
                                                 
45 A July 17, 2006 article in the Sudan Tribune stated that an advisory committee of the Ministry of Animal 
Resources reported that the productive loss from the avian flu outbreak was 500 million SD (US$ 2.3 million; 
$1=218SD) distributed among 119 farmers (Makony 2006). However, a July 5, 2006 article in the Sudan Tribune put 
the total loss in at 2.468 billion SD in Bahri (North Khartoum), Khartoum, Omdurman and Gezira sectors (Rasha 
2006). 
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of war (ERW) may affect 21 of Sudan’s 26 states46 (Landmine Monitor 2006). Of 
particular concern for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, mines have been 
placed along livestock migratory routes and in rangelands, killing and maiming 
herders as well as animals and negatively impacting pastoral livelihoods 
(McGrath 2001).  
The United Nations Mine Action Office47 in Sudan is working with GONU to 
coordinate efforts to identify and clear areas affected by mines and ERW, as 
well as educate populations about explosive hazards (UNMAS 2005). In 2005, 
Sudan received $48.4 million in mine action funding (an increase of $33.4 
million over 2004), which placed it second in the world for such funding 
behind Afghanistan (Landmine Monitor 2006). Insecurity remains a threat to 
mine clearance operations, (especially in Southern Sudan) and government 
restrictions on travel are limiting assessments of mine/ERW effects 
(particularly in Eastern Sudan) (Landmine Monitor 2006). Future interventions 
in this area could give special consideration for clearance of migratory routes 
and rangelands as well as increased educational outreach to pastoralists and 
agro-pastoralists. Other initiatives both within the government and by 
international organizations could also research and quantify the effects of 
mines and ERW specifically on pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. 
Role of International Organizations 
International financial institutions and relief and development organizations 
have long been active in Sudan. An analysis of whether their assistance and 
funding is to the benefit or detriment of the Sudanese poor is much needed 
but beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, there is considerable 
evidence from the last few decades that relief and development organizations 
as well as foreign donors have supported and facilitated the government of 
Sudan’s political and economic agenda that has directly led to today’s 
conflicts and humanitarian crisis. Johnson (2003) notes: 
Since 1989 the government has manipulated the international relief effort to 
further both its economic and strategic goals in the [Southern Sudan] war, but 
it has also tried to harness the active collaboration of relief agencies through 
the ideology of development itself, which has been presented as both 
politically neutral and a strategy for peace. 
Ahmed (2002) offers another perspective, arguing: 
[T]he most damaging decisions to national economies and environments alike 
were introduced and supported by development experts who usually do not 
have sufficient time to answer the question of who benefits from such 
ventures nor do they bother to enlist the views and attitudes of the 
recipients. Furthermore, when such proposals are made, the channels of 
communication are always based on a top to bottom approach or development 
from above. 
                                                 
46 The states most affected by mines and ERW are: Western Equatoria, Southern Kordofan, Upper Nile, Kassala, 
Red Sea, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Blue Nile, Bahr al-Jebel, Eastern Equatoria and Jongli, and also in the Nuba 
Mountains area. In addition, the country’s borders with Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Libya and Uganda are considered mine-affected (ICBL 2006). 
47 The UN Mine Action Office is part of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), whose mandate in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1590 (March 24, 2005) includes engaging in mine action activities. 
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The critiques by Johnson and Ahmed are not new or unique,48 but they raise 
important questions about the politicisation and unintended consequences of 
international development in Sudan. 
The international community has been eager to help Sudan resolve and 
recover from its numerous conflicts, but development and funding agencies 
should give greater consideration to the effects of their involvement on the 
Sudanese poor. For example, United Nations agencies are being asked to 
support the NCP’s new Green Alert Programme for crop and livestock 
production (see “Green Alert Programme” below), but this programme pays 
insufficient attention to the needs and desires of poor farmers and livestock 
keepers; i.e. it does not appear to be pro-poor. Those who answer the NCP’s 
call to provide technical assistance and funding for the Green Alert 
Programme could very well end up supporting development schemes that 
create further population displacements, livelihood insecurity, and conflict.  
Given the anti-poor history of development in Sudan, international 
organizations and financial institutions should conduct political and strategic 
assessments as part of all development initiatives.49 These reviews should look 
beyond the “pro-peace” and “pro-poor” rhetoric commonly used in 
development discourse to examine the likely outcomes of policies and 
projects for the Sudanese poor, including livestock keepers. International 
organizations and financial institutions should also review their past and 
current support of NCP policies and programmes to compare stated objectives 
with actual social, political, economic, and environmental outcomes. Greater 
monitoring and evaluation of the effects of development on the livelihoods of 
the Sudanese poor is urgently needed. 
Regional Issues within Sudan 
The livestock production areas of Sudan are ethnically, geographically, and 
biologically diverse. Livestock keepers throughout Sudan face common 
problems, however, including displacement  owing to conflict and 
development. The following discussion of Darfur, Southern Sudan and Eastern 
Sudan raises salient issues and elaborates some of the aforementioned key 
issues in each region. 
Darfur 
Since 2003, the Darfur region50 in western Sudan has experienced severe 
conflict that has killed an estimated 200,000 people (Hagan and Polloni 2006) 
and displaced 2 to 2.5 million people. The conflict straddles the border with 
Chad, but in July 2006 fighting took place in neighboring North Kordofan. The 
roots of this conflict are complex and tied to decades of misguided 
development policies, power shifts at the local and national levels, growing 
human and livestock populations, and cross-border dynamics with Sudan’s 
neighbors including Chad and Libya51 (Flint and de Waal 2005; ICG 2003; ICG 
2006b; Young et al 2005).  
                                                 
48 With respect to Sudan, Middleton and O’Keefe (2006) note: “…not fully to understand, or to take into account, 
the political objectives of assistance, the politics of the causes of any given emergency and the political objectives 
of those who are afflicted by it, is simultaneously to reduce the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention, and to 
confirm the victimization of those for whom assistance is intended.” 
49 The World Bank has not conducted a Poverty Reduction Strategy review for Sudan. 
50 Darfur here refers to the states of South Darfur, West Darfur, and North Darfur. 
51 One reviewer of this paper stated that the Darfur conflict is fundamentally a ‘farmer versus herder’ conflict, 
but there is substantial information suggesting that the situation is complex and dynamic, with ultimate and 
 28
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in May 2006 offered some hope that 
conditions in Darfur might improve, but many rebel groups did not sign the 
DPA, immediately reducing its legitimacy. Since then, rebel groups have 
atomized and new alliances have formed, such as the National Redemption 
Front (EIU 2006a). The conflict escalated in August 2006 with a government-
led offensive that is further destabilising the region. Government decisions on 
Darfur are made by the ruling National Congress Party, and dissent from these 
policies within Sudan is increasingly difficult and dangerous (ICG 2006b).  
It is difficult to talk realistically about policy interventions to help poor 
livestock owners in Darfur given the security situation. Some sources 
interviewed for this project asserted that as long as conflict persists, new 
policy initiatives or projects in Darfur are likely to reward some groups at the 
expense of others, for example by giving material assistance to groups allied 
to the government that have stolen land and looted livestock. International 
organizations and donors should be wary of supporting or enabling 
governmental livestock policy initiatives in Darfur until peace has been firmly 
established. There may be greater opportunity to help livestock keepers 
through local non-governmental organizations or international relief 
organizations; however, there is a risk that such aid could still be politicised 
and benefit some groups at the expense of others (Duffield 2002). 
When peace comes to Darfur, the issue of land tenure will need to be near the 
top of the priority list for action. Many sources interviewed for this project 
stated that land tenure is the most important issue in Darfur after peace. The 
DPA called for creation of a Land Commission, but conflict renders this 
commission moribund. Future peace agreements should build upon the DPA 
and provide for creation of a Land Commission that operates transparently and 
allows for the evolution of indigenous land management systems. In addition, 
international organizations and donors should ensure that policies are in place 
to include poor livestock keepers in the design and implementation of land 
tenure agreements (cf. Mohamed 2006). Policies for land use and ownership 
should be locally generated and flexible to account for seasonal and annual 
variations in fodder production.  
The conflict in Darfur is notable for the tactical and strategic use of livestock 
looting by numerous warring factions (Young et al 2005). Many displaced 
households lost the vast majority of their livestock  owing to looting (CESVI 
2005), while others lost livestock  owing to disease, malnutrition, and 
starvation after they fled fighting (CHF 2005). When peace is established and 
the displaced can be resettled, policy initiatives should be based on the 
expressed needs and desires of those who lost livestock. Restocking 
programmes focused on donkeys, chickens, and small ruminants could enable 
the restoration of livelihoods for resettled populations (Hamid et al 2005; CHF 
2005), although avian flu concerns may preclude future poultry restocking 
efforts. In addition, Young et al (2005) have proposed a Livestock 
Reconciliation and Compensation Commission for Darfur to encourage the 
voluntary return of looted livestock, provide certificates of ownership for 
livestock, and direct tax money from the sale of livestock to households that 
lost animals  owing to looting. This proposal merits further attention. 
Peace will create opportunities for other pro-poor livestock policy 
interventions. There will be a clear need for rapid and accurate censuses of 
people, livestock, and natural resources upon which to base development 
decisions. The marketing system will need considerable reconstruction. Pro-
poor policies could provide for expanded and subsidized veterinary care, but 
                                                                                                                                            
proximate causes, including political and economic exclusion of Darfurian groups from the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (Young 2005). 
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sources interviewed for this project also stressed the importance of creating 
water points for livestock, particularly along migratory and trade routes (cf. 
Young et al 2005). 
Southern Sudan 
The January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the war 
between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan (see also “The CPA and the 
New Sudan” above). Among its many other provisions, the CPA calls for a 
referendum in 2011 on whether the South will remain part of a united Sudan 
or become independent (CPA 2005). The late President of GOSS John Garang 
advocated a unified Sudan, but his successor Salva Kiir is viewed as being 
supportive of independence for the South, particularly given his strained 
relations with NCP and recent problems implementing the CPA (ICG 2006a; ICG 
2005).  
The implementation of the CPA has been fraught with difficulty and it remains 
a distinct possibility that it will fail.52 The NCP that controls GONU has 
systematically delayed or undermined implementation of the CPA and fostered 
divisions within the South, in large part to maintain control over key oil 
producing areas and oil revenue (ICG 2006a). The success of the CPA has also 
been undermined by the SPLM/A, which faces enormous obstacles in creating 
new government structures in a region scarred by conflict and historically 
underdeveloped. The SPLM has been wracked with internal divisions since the 
July 2005 death of President John Garang, but it also has weak capacity to 
provide security, govern, and control and plan expenditure (ICG 2006a; EIU 
2006). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2006b), “there remains a 
risk that over time the persistence of delays and disputes will steadily 
undermine the credibility of the CPA and increase the scope for the parties (in 
particular the [NCP]) to renege on it.” 
For poor livestock owners, the CPA offers great opportunities but its failure 
could continue their marginalisation and deepen their poverty. There is still 
significant insecurity throughout the South, which both limits development 
efforts and hinders the return of refugees and IDPs to some areas. The lack of 
security is a symptom of the larger institutional problems within GOSS, which 
extend to the nascent Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries. Other 
significant issues for poor livestock owners in Southern Sudan are disease 
control efforts, land tenure and border clarification, improvement of the 
marketing system, and instability in oil producing areas.53 
Security. Southern Sudan faces many security-related challenges including 
transforming the SPLA into a formal army, demilitarizing militias, eliminating 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, demining, and deterring persistent cattle raiding 
(EIU 2006a; ICG 2006a). Security is the linchpin to larger efforts to help poor 
livestock keepers in Southern Sudan. Without security, efforts to improve the 
marketing system, conduct human and livestock censuses, and expand disease 
control efforts are likely to fail in whole or in part. Recommendations on how 
to increase security in Southern Sudan are beyond the scope of this paper, but 
the importance of increased security for pro-poor livestock policy 
interventions cannot be overstated. 
Institutional Issues. GOSS faces many challenges in establishing its authority 
and administration over Southern Sudan. In accordance with the CPA, GOSS 
                                                 
52 The design of the CPA has also been criticized for giving too much power to NCP and SPLM and excluding many 
of Sudan’s other opposition groups, thus leading to conflict and the need for separate peace processes for Darfur 
and Eastern Sudan. See Middleton and O’Keefe (2006) and Young (2005). 
53 Abate (2006) provides an overview of the different livelihood systems within Southern Sudan and discusses 
additional issues not discussed here, such as fodder production. 
 30
has executive, legislative, and judicial power over the ten states of the south. 
The creation of governmental institutions has proven difficult, however, 
because the SPLM/A did not have a very developed political system or a large 
cadre of trained personnel prior to the peace agreement upon which to build 
the new government. Additionally, GOSS now has authority over ten state 
governments, some of which have minimal administrative infrastructure, 
whereas others—such as the Bahr al-Jebel and Western Equatorial 
governments—are comparatively affluent and organized. GOSS struggles to 
build institutions and extend its power while also facing limitations imposed 
by a transportation and communications infrastructure that is slow and 
unreliable (EIU 2006a). 
Among the new ministries within GOSS is the Ministry of Animal Resources and 
Fisheries (MARF). As of June 2006, this ministry had only five staff including 
the minister and they were just moving into their own building. For the 
foreseeable future the ministry will be heavily dependant upon technical 
assistance from international organizations, such as FAO. Given the very real 
possibility that Southern Sudan will vote to form its own nation in 2011, there 
is an urgent need to increase the size and capabilities of MARF so that it can 
undertake planning and implementation of pro-poor livestock policies and 
projects. 
After security, one of GOSS’s main focuses is on increasing infrastructure in 
the south. With international assistance, numerous road projects are 
underway and several rail links have been proposed that would better link 
Southern Sudan with Northern Sudan and with the Greater Horn of Africa and 
the Great Lakes Area (Garang 2005). These transportation links could open 
new opportunities for the marketing of Southern Sudan’s livestock to Uganda, 
Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as 
international markets through ports in Kenya and DRC. Southern Sudan will 
also likely continue to send live animals to the commodity chain in Northern 
Sudan, from where they could go to expanding markets in Egypt and the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
One issue of potentially great significance for poor livestock owners in 
Southern Sudan is the proposed construction of a massive 5,000 megawatt 
hydroelectric dam south of Juba. This project is important for two reasons. 
First, the project could use up to half of GOSS’s budget for the next fifteen 
years (Juba Post 2006), drawing money away from other pressing 
developmental and institutional needs. Second, the dam could create a large 
impoundment area that floods vast areas of land, leading to significant social 
displacement and economic disruption.54 If the project moves forward, 
international organizations and donors should work with GOSS to ensure that 
policies are in place to provide for the comprehensive study of the project’s 
social and environmental impacts, as well as fair compensation and adequate 
services for displaced populations. 
Land Tenure. Land tenure is a significant and controversial issue in Southern 
Sudan. The CPA provided for a Southern Sudan Land Commission (SSLC) that 
will work in conjunction with the National Land Commission in the north. The 
President of GOSS has appointed five commissioners to the SSLC, but as of 
October 2006 it had not begun its work  owing to NCP’s failure to set up the 
National Land Commission. Additionally, the CPA created the Abyei Boundaries 
Commission (ABC) to define the Abyei area of Southern Kordofan, which 
straddles north and south Sudan and includes important oil production areas 
(see discussion in “Land Commissions” above). 
                                                 
54 The smaller Merowe dam project in northern Sudan displaced an estimated 50,000 people. 
  31
The SSLC and ABC will complement the work of GOSS and the southern states 
to determine issues of land use and ownership. This work is urgent as an 
estimated 2 million refugees and IDPs (and their livestock) begin to return to 
Southern Sudan. According to Polloni (2005; cf. Kenyi 2006): 
In conformity with the general principle that ‘land in the new Sudan belongs 
to the communities’, the SPLM [GOSS] judiciary system relies primarily on 
customary legislation. This is characterised by absence of formal land 
registration, predominance of land use (as opposed to ownership) rights, 
vesting of power to allocate land in tribal chiefs, loss of land rights in the 
event of protracted non-use, virtual absence of land sales and possible 
coexistence of overlapping rights on the same territory.  
The potential problems arising from this focus on customary law are 
numerous, including discrimination against women who do not have customary 
rights to land and uneven documentation of customary rules across tribes and 
territories (Polloni 2005).  
The international donors and organizations providing policy and institutional 
support in Southern Sudan need to ensure that GOSS considers the needs and 
desires of poor livestock owners in the design and implementation of policies 
that affect them. As with Darfur, there is a need in Southern Sudan for a 
flexible land tenure system to account for livestock keepers’ changing land 
needs related to flooding and annual variations in fodder production. Polloni 
(2005) suggests converting customary land rights into statutory land rights to 
protect local populations from returnees and land speculators, but this could 
also serve to validate land seizures including oil-related displacements. GOSS 
and the ten states should also consider adopting policies to require impact 
assessments and feasibility studies for all resettlement or development 
projects over a certain size to ensure that land conditions (e.g. water 
availability and soil conditions) are appropriate for the intended use. 
Another significant issue that will affect land tenure is the resurrection of 
plans to construct the Jonglei canal. The Jonglei canal would divert water 
away from the massive swamps in southern Sudan to increase the water 
availability for agricultural development in Sudan and Egypt55 (Johnson 2003). 
When construction on the canal began in 1974, there was considerable local 
opposition based on the fact that the canal would cut through livestock 
migratory routes and negatively harm pastoral livelihoods (Majok and Schwabe 
1996). In December 1983 the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
attacked the canal and construction equipment, effectively ending this 
project (Niblock 1987). The project was revived in 2006, however, through the 
Green Alert Programme and negotiations between GOSS and the government 
of Egypt (Willow 2006). If construction of the canal resumes, it could have 
profound environmental and social effects, including disruption of migratory 
routes for Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk livestock keepers56 (Willow 2006). 
As the technical capacities of the GOSS are limited, it almost certainly would 
welcome LPI support and involvement in its various deliberations that affect 
land use and tenure. 
Disease Control. Peace in Southern Sudan creates opportunities for improving 
disease control policies and practices. During the war, the UNICEF-sponsored 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) included provision of veterinary services, 
training of CAHWs, and extension of disease control efforts in the South 
                                                 
55 The canal was planned to be 360 km long and 54 m wide (Lako 1985). 
56 Several individuals and the Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) have recently voiced concerns about the 
environmental and social effects of the Jonglei Canal. See http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article17510, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18878, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18051, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article17304, sites visited February 6, 2007. 
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(Catley and Leyland 2001; Johnson 2003; Jones et al 1998). As peace has taken 
hold and displaced populations have started to return home (often with their 
livestock), there are growing concerns about new outbreaks of disease. These 
concerns have been heightened by the September 2006 outbreak of avian flu 
in Juba (OIE 2006b). International organizations such as UNICEF, VSF, and FAO 
are engaged in distributing vaccines, training CAHWs, and monitoring disease 
outbreaks, but there needs to be greater attention paid to building 
institutional capacity within MARF and promoting legislation within GOSS to 
provide poor livestock owners with low-cost, veterinary care of reasonable 
quality, access to drugs and vaccines, and disease control and surveillance.  
Marketing. Peace not only exposes long-standing constraints for livestock 
marketing in Southern Sudan but also presents new opportunities. During the 
war, fighting disrupted traditional commodity chains for the sale of livestock 
through the North, leading to the increased sale of Sudanese cattle in Uganda 
(HRW 2003). Infrastructure problems that predated the most recent civil war 
persist, increasing the chances to spread or contract diseases and forcing 
traders to walk animals to markets (King and Mukasa-Mugerwa 2002). On the 
other hand, peace has brought international aid and development programmes 
to Southern Sudan that aim to improve the livestock marketing system. 
Current projects include extension of veterinary services, improvement of 
markets and roads, and provision of services to returning displaced 
populations and their livestock (cf. UNHCR 2006). Bure (2005) suggests 
creating cattle and sheep raising centers to supplement peasant production, 
but the effects of large-scale livestock production operations for poor 
livestock owners should be studied before a shift to ranching takes place. 
Currently between 50 and 60 percent of Southern Sudan’s population are 
believed to rely upon livestock for their livelihood (King and Mukasa-Mugerwa 
2002; cf. JAM 2005). 
The limitations of the banking system in Southern Sudan have significance for 
the improvement of livestock marketing. In July 2006 the Bank of Southern 
Sudan—the new central bank for the south—was set up in Juba, the capital of 
Southern Sudan. The Bank is based on a conventional system of administration 
(the Bank of Sudan in the north is based on Islamic law), but it has very weak 
capacity and is understaffed (EIU 2006). The financial system in Southern 
Sudan is also hampered by the lack of a unified currency. In early 2007 the 
Central Bank of Sudan will introduce a new national currency (the pound, 
replacing the dinar), but in Southern Sudan the Ugandan shilling and U.S. 
dollar are still commonly used for commercial transactions. The extension of 
financial services could provide livestock owners with new opportunities for 
storing wealth and give traders access to credit for the purchase of livestock 
from primary producers (King and Mukasa-Mugerwa 2002). 
GOSS needs to improve its institutional capacity for managing and promoting 
the livestock marketing system. Although GOSS is currently reliant upon 
international assistance and oil for its revenue, it should move to increase its 
revenue from livestock production by delegating one agency to oversee the 
marketing system and coordinate the efforts of governments, producers, and 
traders to improve production and exports (cf. Aklilu 2002). This lead agency 
could be MARF or the Ministry of Foreign Trade, but regardless, it should 
initiate legislation and undertake projects to modernise the marketing system, 
for example by improving water supplies along trekking routes, consolidating 
the tax structure, and enhancing the communication infrastructure to extend 
market information to primary producers and disease information among 
veterinary and border control workers (cf. King and Mugerwa 2002). Such 
activities could also give GOSS greater visibility, credibility, and legitimacy 
among the diverse populations of Southern Sudan. 
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Oil. Control over oil revenues and production areas remain at the center of 
problems in Southern Sudan. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Government of 
Sudan and multinational oil companies forcibly displaced pastoralists and 
farmers from areas of oil exploration, extraction, or transport (i.e. pipelines) 
(HRW 2003; ARSC 2001). During this same period, the activities of 
international human rights groups helped force the withdrawal of Western oil 
companies from Sudan, but this simply created a vacuum that was filled by oil 
companies from less human rights conscious countries in Asia, most notably 
China, without changing the unpleasant realities on the ground (Patey 2006; 
cf. EIU 2006). The CPA provides for GONU to share revenue with GOSS, but the 
lack of transparency in both the distribution and management of oil revenues 
has led to concerns about corruption (EIU 2006a). 
Policy interventions to safeguard the rights of displaced populations could 
include new legislation within GOSS to provide for citizen involvement in 
development planning for oil exploration and extraction. In addition, 
international organizations could engage with multi-national oil companies to 
“design measures which ensure that human rights susceptibility does not 
become a competitive weakness for a corporation, while implementing 
measures that assist in ensuring the presence of the company is not damaging 
to efforts of peace and development” (Paley 2006).  
Eastern Sudan 
Conflict in Eastern Sudan57 is closely tied to the conflicts in Darfur and 
Southern Sudan, although it has received much less international attention. 
The Beja ethnic group, who comprise about one-half of Eastern Sudan’s 
population, formed the Beja Congress in the mid-1960s to express grievances 
about historic political and economic marginalisation. The Nimeiri regime did 
little to help Eastern Sudan, and the droughts and famines of the 1980s 
devastated rural farmers and pastoralists, with the Beja reportedly losing up 
to 80 percent of their animals (ICG 2006). Also during the 1980s, refugees (and 
their livestock) were pouring into Eastern Sudan from Eritrea, leading to local 
conflicts (Bascom 1990).  
Beja frustration reached new heights in the 1990s when the Sudanese 
government of President Al-Bashir cracked down on political opposition, 
confiscated large tracts of fertile farmland without compensation, and 
aggressively promoted its version of Islam in Beja areas (ICG 2003; ICG 2006). 
The Beja Congress joined the opposition National Democratic Alliance58 (NDA) 
in 1995 and waged low-intensity warfare in Eastern Sudan with help from the 
SPLA and the Eritrean government. When the Beja Congress was excluded 
from the IGAD-sponsored peace talks between the NCP and SPLM/A, it 
asserted itself by forming an alliance with Darfur rebel groups (in 2004) and 
creating the Eastern Front (in 2005) along with the smaller Rashaida Free 
Lions insurgency (ICG 2006). 
Eastern Sudan is of great strategic importance because it contains Port Sudan 
as well the roads, rail lines, and oil pipelines leading to the port. Port Sudan is 
vital to Sudan’s economy as the site where oil from central and southern 
Sudan is loaded on to ships and then delivered to China, India, Japan, and 
other mainly-Asian countries. The port is also the main point of departure for 
live animals from Sudan.59 In 2005, live animal exports constituted 13 percent 
                                                 
57 Eastern Sudan comprises the three states of Red Sea, Kassala, and Gedaref. 
58 NDA is an alliance of opposition political groups including the SPLM, Umma Party, Democratic Union Party, Beja 
Congress, and others (see ICG 2006).  
59 By value, 72 percent of Sudan’s live animal exports in 2003 were through Port Sudan (ARSC 2004), the 
remainder being flown out of Khartoum or transported on the ground into neighboring countries. 
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of Sudan’s non-oil export revenues, making the security and stability of Port 
Sudan of great significance for Sudan’s national economy as well as livestock 
owners and traders (Central Bank of Sudan 2005; cf. Aklilu 2002).  
Pastoral livelihoods in Eastern Sudan have been seriously undermined by 
drought, large crop production schemes, and desertification (ICG 2006). The 
erosion of pastoral life has contributed to the deepening poverty of the 
eastern population, which in turn has led to conflict. Nonetheless, livestock 
(mainly small ruminants, camels, and poultry) are still maintained by 
traditional pastoralists, villagers, and tenant farmers and laborers in areas of 
mechanised agriculture, such as the Butana (Akhtar 1993; cf. FAO 2005).  
Peace talks to end conflict in Eastern Sudan progressed throughout 2006, 
leading to an agreement in October 2006. The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement 
(ESPA) between the Eastern Front and GONU is based on power and wealth 
sharing, similar to the CPA and DPA. The agreement establishes an Eastern 
Sudan States’ Coordinating Council to increase cooperation between the three 
eastern states and calls for a conference to be held during 2007 to “revisit the 
administrative structure of the country” (Art. 5). Whereas the CPA gave the 
SPLM a Vice Presidency and the DPA gave Darfur a “Special Assistant” to 
President Al-Bashir, the ESPA creates an “Assistant to the President” for the 
Eastern Front (Art. 8). The agreement also provides for Eastern Front 
representation in the Council of Ministers (Art. 8) and National Assembly (Art. 
9). Where the CPA and DPA created new Land Commissions, the ESPA provides 
Eastern Front representation on the National Land Commission authorized in 
the CPA (Art. 12). The ESPA also creates a special fund for reconstruction and 
development from the national budget (Art. 19). 
With respect to the contentious issue of land use, the ESPA makes several 
general promises. Article 21 states that laws regulating land use and 
ownership will incorporate “customary laws and practices, local heritage and 
international trends and practices;” however, this potentially sets up a clash 
between customary communal land use and the international practice of 
private ownership. Article 21 further states: 
The [GONU] shall ensure that all citizens affected by the development of land 
and/or national resources are consulted. Persons whose property or livelihood 
is adversely affected by development of land and/or national resources have a 
right to adequate compensation… All persons arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived 
of their rights to land shall have those rights restored to them.  
These statements lack the temporal specificity to determine whether 
compensation and rights will be restored to Eastern Sudan livestock keepers 
who have already lost their lands and livelihoods, or whether the provisions 
apply only to future displacement and land seizure. There are multiple 
opportunities for policy intervention to clarify land use rights in Eastern 
Sudan, for example through state-level legislation to create commissions to 
review past land seizures and recommend appropriate compensation 
measures. In addition, the needs of current pastoralists and agro-pastoralists 
could be addressed through clarification of migratory routes and pastureland 
and rangeland access, for example in the Butana and Gash areas.  
The ESPA offers hope for peace and development, but its success is far from 
assured. There may be difficulties in implementation because “not all eastern 
rebels are represented in the negotiations, and there is considerable 
resentment against the government in the east (EIU 2006a). Cattle- and 
sheep-raiding along the border with Ethiopia is also a persistent problem (Tito 
2006; Al-Sahafa 2006), with the potential to escalate and disrupt the peace 
process. One source interviewed for this project expressed skepticism about 
the Eastern Front’s ability to address land use and other pressing issues, 
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stating that during peace negotiations the Eastern Front was focused on 
achieving power within the national government without consideration for 
bottom-up political and economic development. 
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APPENDIX A. LIVESTOCK IN SUDAN 
Cattle. Cattle (bos taurus) have great social and economic importance in 
Sudan. The ARSC reported the total cattle population in 2003 in Sudan to be 
39.7 million (ARSC 2004), nearly double the estimated population of 20 million 
in 1987 (Majok and Schwabe 1996). There are twenty breeds of cattle in Sudan 
(Sudan 2006), but the two main groups of cattle are Zebu (including Kenana, 
Butana, Baggara, Murle, and Nuba Mountain) and Nilotic (Majok and Schwabe 
1996; Rege et al 2001; Ageeb 1991). In addition, Holstein-Friesian cattle from 
Europe have been imported to Sudan for milk production and breeding60 
(Ahmed and El Amin 1997; Ageeb and Hayes 2000).  
Cattle and cattle products serve a variety of important social and economic 
functions. For poor livestock keepers, cattle effectively function as a bank, 
whereby livestock keepers sell cattle when they need money and buy cattle as 
an investment when they have extra money. Depending on local traditions and 
customs, cattle may also be used for ritual sacrifice or serve as currency; for 
example cattle may be used to pay bride price or serve as compensation for 
the settlement of disputes. Cattle are occasionally used as draught animals on 
farms and for transportation. Cattle produce milk, meat, and hides that may 
be consumed locally or sold commercially for domestic use or export.61 In 
Southern Sudan, cattle provide dung for fuel, dung ash (used to ward off 
biting insects for animals and people), and urine (for bathing, washing milking 
utensils, dressing wounds); urine and dung are also used for fertilizer (Majok 
and Schwabe 1996).  
Sheep. Sheep (ovis aries) are Sudan’s number one livestock export. There are 
four main types of Sudanese sheep (Desert, Nilotic, Arid Upland, and 
Equatorial Upland) and seventeen breeds (El-Hag 2001; Sudan 2006). Sudan 
Desert sheep comprise more than 65 percent of the total sheep in Sudan and 
nearly 100 percent of Sudan’s sheep exports62 (El-Hag et al 2001; Mufarrih 
1991). The ARSC reports that in 2003 there were 48.4 million sheep in Sudan 
(ARSC 2004), up from 18 million in 1987 (Majok and Schwabe 1996).  
Nomads, transhumants, and sedentary farmers raise sheep to produce meat 
and milk, and to a lesser extent skins (Abdelgadir et al 1998). Sudan exports 
live sheep and sheep meat mainly to Saudi Arabia, with small amounts also 
going to other Arab countries such as Libya, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan 
(ARSC 2004). Although statistics for milk production are unreliable and vary 
widely, in 1996 the Ministry of Animal Resources estimated total milk 
production from sheep at 650,000 tons, or roughly 9 percent of Sudan’s total 
milk production (Abdelgadir et al 1998). 
Goats. Goats (capra hircus) are an important source of milk and meat in 
Sudan. The ARSC reports that in 2003 the goat population of Sudan was 42 
million (ARSC 2004), up from 13 million in 1987 (Majok and Schwabe 1996). 
There are 11 breeds of goat in Sudan (Sudan 2006), the most common being 
Sudan Desert and Nubian goats. The Nubian goat is the only specialised milk 
breed (Kamal et al 2005). Three exotic breeds of goats (Saanen, Toggenburge, 
                                                 
60 Holstein-Friesian cattle are generally kept by wealthier individuals and companies that can provide for the 
specialized needs of these cattle; therefore poor pastoralists do not generally own this type of cattle. 
61 Cattle generally need to consume 1-4% of their weight in dry matter every day. Normally an allowance of 3% per 
day equates to roughly 15 kg of dry matter (50 kg of green grasses) for an adult. A milk cow requires five liters of 
water to produce one liter of milk.  
62 There are many subtypes of Sudan Desert sheep, including Hamari, Kabashi, Shenbali, Shugor, Dubasi, Watish, 
and Bourug (El-Hag et al 2001). 
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and Anglo-Nubian) were imported to Sudan in 1976 to improve the milk 
production of local breeds (Kamal et al 2005). 
Goats are important socially and economically. Goats are an important source 
of meat and milk, especially for poor families. Goats may also be used as a 
form of currency, for example as a bride price or payment of a debt or fine. 
Goats are most commonly kept by sedentary farmers and families in urban and 
peri-urban areas, although some nomads and transhumants also keep them 
(Fadlalla and Ahmed 1997). Goats consume about 10 kg of lush greens per day 
(2.5 kg dry matter). In urban and peri-urban areas, goats may primarily feed 
on household food waste and street refuse (Fadlalla and Ahmed 1997). Goat 
milk and meat is mainly consumed domestically, although goat skins are a 
growing export: nearly 3 million goat skins were reportedly exported in 2003 
(ARSC 2004).  
Camels. There are five breeds of camels (camelus dromedarius) in Sudan 
(Sudan 2006).  The ARSC reports that in 2003 there were 3.5 million camels in 
Sudan (ARSC 2004), up from 2.7 million camels in 1987 (Majok and Schwabe 
1996). Camels are generally found in the desert and semi-desert regions 
between latitudes 12 and 16° N; most of the camels are located in the Darfur, 
Kordofan, and Eastern Sudan. Camel milk is consumed locally, and live camels 
and camel meat are exported from Sudan, mainly to Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
(ARSC 2004). Camels are also used to transport people and packs, and to a 
lesser degree for herding, draught, and oil milling (cf. Wilson 1978). 
Equines. Donkeys (equus asinus) and horses (equinus caballus) are important 
beasts of burden in Sudan. There are no reliable figures on the number of 
donkeys and horses in Sudan, but a government estimate places the current 
combined total of equines at around 4 million (MOST 2006), up from an 
estimated 790,000 donkeys and 93,000 horses in 1977 (Wilson 1978a). There 
are five breeds of donkeys and five breeds of horses in Sudan (Sudan 2006). 
Donkeys are integral to the livelihoods of rural Sudan, but they also play an 
important role in the livelihoods of the urban and peri-urban poor. In rural 
areas, donkeys are used for short-range transportation, herding, and to carry 
water, food, and other goods. Donkeys are also sometimes used to pull plows 
(Osman et al 2005). In rural areas, people who do not own donkeys are usually 
the poorest of the poor, namely the elderly, disabled, displaced, or otherwise 
dependent (Fernando and Starkey 1997; Tabarak 2005). In urban areas, 
donkeys and donkey carts are used by vendors selling water or milk and for 
transporting people or goods, thus providing an important source of income 
for farmers and pastoralists who migrated to cities  owing to drought or war 
(cf. Fernando and Starkey 1997).   
Horses are mainly used for herding cattle and transporting goods and people. 
Most horses are found in rural areas, especially South Darfur and South 
Kordofan, but they are also found in urban areas where they are used to pull 
carts. Horses are bigger and stronger than donkeys, but they are more 
expensive (ARSC 2004) and require more food, making them unaffordable for 
many poor people. 
Poultry. Poultry is an important branch of livestock for Sudan’s sedentary 
poor populations. Production systems in households are based on scavenging 
indigenous domestic chickens (gallus gallus); some households also raise 
pigeons (columba livia), guinea fowls (numida meleagris), ducks (anas 
platyrhynchos), and turkeys (meleagris gallopavo). In Sudan there are three 
breeds of chicken and one breed each of pigeon, guinea fowl, turkey, and 
duck (Sudan 2006). In non-industrial settings, poultry generally feed on 
household food waste, but their diets may be supplemented with cereals 
(Khalafalla et al 2002).  
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There are no reliable numbers of poultry in Sudan; recent estimates for 
chickens range from 18.6 million to 45.3 million (Ibrahim 1999; Khalafalla et al 
2002). Regardless of the total number, poor farmers and livestock keepers are 
responsible for an estimated 80 percent of total poultry production (Ibrahim 
1999). Near Khartoum there are many small poultry farms with capacities 
ranging from 1,000 to 50,000 birds. In addition there are 6 intensive system 
farms each with a capacity of around 250,000 birds (OIE 2006). Sudan’s 
chicken production industry is heavily reliant upon the import of day old 
chicks and fertilized eggs63 (ARSC 2004). The 2006 outbreaks of avian flu may 
have significant short-term effects upon poultry production in Sudan (see 
“Disease Control” above). 
                                                 
63 In 2003, Sudan imported approximately 2.5 million day old chicks and 7.4 million fertilized eggs (ARSC 2004). 
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APPENDIX B. PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
Livestock production systems in Sudan have changed over time  owing to 
internal and external influences. Large deve`lopment schemes, 
desertification, drought, war, population growth, and other factors have 
affected pastoral systems of livelihood. The different production systems 
present in Sudan are summarised below. Pastoral nomads, transhumants, and 
sedentary farmers possess up to 90 percent of the animal wealth in Sudan; 
therefore they are responsible for the major source of meat for domestic and 
export markets (Ahmed 2002). 
Nomadic. Nomads move permanently between seasonal pastures with their 
animals (cattle, camels, sheep, and some goats). They engage in extensive 
pastoralism in which livestock are herded upon the open range (Majok and 
Schwabe 1996). Nomads spend the rainy season in the northern, semi-desert 
zone and the dry season further south into the savannah. There are widely 
ranging estimates of the number of nomads in Sudan (cf. Ibrahim 1999; Ahmed 
2002; Manger 2001), but they tend to own the largest herds (Ibrahim 1999). 
Transhumant. In transhumance, households depend mainly on livestock 
herding but seasonally return for a period to grazing and farming or harvesting 
around a home base (Majok and Schwabe 1996; Ibrahim 1999). In western 
Sudan, households and livestock (cattle, sheep, camels) migrate north during 
the rainy season and return south to the savannah during the dry season. In 
Southern Sudan, Dinka transhumants move with livestock (cattle, sheep, 
goats) to grazing areas (toich) during the dry season and back to their 
permanent homesteads during the rainy season (Majok and Schwabe 1996). 
Transhumants may also possess and travel with chickens (Wilson 1979; cf. 
Majok and Schwabe 1996). 
Sedentary. In the sedentary production system, households that are settled in 
villages and depend predominantly on rainfed crop farming also possess small 
herds of livestock, (goats, cattle), which are used as sources of food and 
storage for wealth (Ibrahim 1999). Poultry provide meat and eggs for 
sedentary households (Khalafallah et al 2002). 
Migratory agropastoral. A migratory agropastoral system is found in southern 
Sudan, where livestock (cattle, sheep, goats) are raised in traditional rainfed 
agricultural systems in settled villages. Livestock are moved away from the 
Nile River in the period of flooding and back when the floods recede (Fadlalla 
and Ahmed 1997). 
Sedentary irrigated-crop livestock system. In irrigated areas of central 
Sudan, permanently settled farmers raise crops and maintain livestock herds 
(sheep, goats, some cattle). Productivity is low and animals depend heavily on 
crop residues, industrial by-products and the grazing of limited areas of fallow 
and the sides of canals. The sale of livestock is a supplementary source of 
income used to hire labor for agricultural work before the harvest. (Fadlalla 
and Ahmed 1997; Ibrahim 1999). 
Urban production. Although the vast majority of Sudan’s livestock are in rural 
areas, some are also found in urban and peri-urban areas (Salih 1985). Equines 
(especially donkeys) are used for transportation of goods and people, 
especially milk delivery. Cattle and camels are found mainly in peri-urban 
households, while sheep, goats, and chickens are common in urban and peri-
urban areas. In addition, industrial production centers for dairy, chicken, and 
eggs are found near major population centers, particularly Khartoum. 
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Commercial ranches. Large commercial ranches were first proposed by 
international development consultants in the 1970s, but  owing to problems 
with international finance and domestic political opposition, these ranches 
never became a reality (Adams and Howell 1979; Ibrahim 1999). During the 
1990s, the Sudanese government once again embraced commercial ranches as 
a way to modernise the livestock sector (Manger 2001), and the government’s 
2006 Green Alert Programme calls for private sector establishment of “range 
farms and ranches” (MAF 2006). 
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